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Rules, Regulations and Transaction Costs  
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I. Introduction 
This report presents the findings of a study made by Yordanka Gancheva, Researcher at the Institute for Market 
Economics, Sofia, within the framework of the project on Rules, Regulations and Transaction Costs in 
Transition Bulgaria funded under the Individual Research Support Scheme of the Open Society Support 
Foundation, Prague. 
Both, the quantitative and qualitative approach were used in the study. The quantitative information was collected 
mainly by structured (closed-end) questionnaires and in-depth interviews. 
The field work was carried out in March and April 2000 by the Agency for Social and Economic Analyses 
(ASA). The interviewees were managers, owners and chief accountants of 120 small and medium-sized 
businesses in 21 Bulgarian towns. 
The main objective of the study was to identify and estimate the transaction costs of small businesses 
in Bulgaria. This task is particularly important in view of the current macroeconomic realities in the 
country. 
Three years after the introduction of a currency board in Bulgaria, the economy is heading for a third successive 
year of moderate economic growth. If official statistical data is to be trusted, this or next year the real per capita 
income should reach its 1991 level. The forecasts are, that the per capita GDP in 2000 would amount 
approximately USD 1,600 or, in the event of purchasing power parity - USD 4,240. However, the problem is 
that official statistical data tends to be an ever poorer reflection of economic reality in Bulgaria. A number of 
studies1 have confirmed the overall perception that the share of the shadow economy - i.e. those lucrative 
dealings which are not caught by either the National Statistical Institute, or the tax administration - is somewhere 
between 22 and 40%. 
We cannot be certain about the exact dimensions of the shadow economy, but  seems it develops more 
dynamically than the registered economy. This could mean two things: either a) the many newly-formed 
companies start operating in the shades, or b) companies having started in the daylight tend to go underground. 
                                                 
1 See for example N. Nenovski and K. Christov, A Study of Money in Circulation after the Introduction of the Currency 
Board in Bulgaria, Bulgarian National Bank, May 2000. See also the report of a joint study of the Harvard Institute of 
International Development, Institute for Market Economics, and Agency for Economic Analyses and Forecasts, "The 
Shadow Economy in Bulgaria". 
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Generally, the reason is that the transaction costs of operating in the daylight grow as compared to the costs of 
operating in the shades. Hence, the identification, measurement and reduction of transaction costs would 
be critical in curbing the "grey" segment of the Bulgarian economy. 
The present study focuses on the transaction costs of small and medium-sized enterprises in the private 
sector. There exsist many reasons to choose them, but I would like to point out here only the following: 
— by National Statistical Institute data, in 1998 there were 515,869 active private economic entities in the 
country, out of a total of 538,161 (96%); 
— again, by data of the National Statistical Institute, the private sector share of GVA (Gross Value Added) 
was 63.75% in 1998, and 65.35% in 1999; 
— according to official statistical data, out of a total of 3,071,913 persons employed in the economy in 
1999, 63.26% were employed in the private sector. This percentage, however, must have been much 
higher in reality due to the unformal labour market in that sector; 
— according to statistical data, nearly 99% of Bulgarian private enterprises meet the definitions of "micro-
enterprises" or "small enterprises" according to definisions of the Law on Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises;2 
— the on-going process of privatisation gives rise to the assumption that the private sector should prevail in 
the future also. For that reason, it is very important to identify and estimate the transaction costs in that 
sector. That would enable us to eliminate or at least reduce these costs at a later stage. It  would promote 
production and increase the price competitiveness of firms and the volumes of exchange. And these are 
three out of the seven main sources of economic growth defined by Professor Gwartney and Professor 
Stroup.3 
In order, however, to identify and estimate transaction costs, we should first of all define the underlying concept 
of "transaction cost". 
It is well known, that the theory of transaction costs develops incessantly and no standard terminology exists yet. 
There are numerous and diverging definitions of transaction costs.  
For instance, Kenneth Arrow4 defines transaction costs as "the costs of running the economic system".  
Yoram Barzel, though defines these costs as "the costs associated with the transfer, capture and protection of 
rights", while Trainn Eggertsson observes: "In general terms, transaction costs are the costs that arise when 
individuals exchange ownership rights to economic assets and enforce their exclusive rights. A clear-cut definition 
                                                 
2 The Law on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises defines micro-enterprises as small enterprises employing up to 10 
persons on average; small enterprises are those employing up to 50 persons on average, and medium-sized enterprises 
are those employing up to 100 persons on average. 
3 See James D. Gwartney and Richard L. Stroup, What Everyone Should Know About Economics and Prosperity, 1993. 
4 All citations used on this page were quoted by Alexandra Benham and Lee Benham in Measuring the Costs of 
Exchange, presented at the Second Annual Meeting of ISNIE, September 17-19, 1998, Université de Paris I. 
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of transaction costs does not exist, but neither are the costs of production in the neo-classical model well 
defined".5  
Eirik Furubotn and Rudolf Richter consider that "transaction costs include the costs of resources utilized for the 
creation, maintenance, use, change and so on of institutions and organizations. When considered in relation to 
existing property and contract rights, transaction costs consist of the costs of the defining and estimating resources 
or claims, plus the costs of utilizing and enforcing the rights specified. Applied to the transfer of existing property 
rights and the establishment or transfer of contract rights between individuals (or legal entities), transaction costs 
include the costs of information, negotiation, and enforcement". Furubotn and Richter recognise two forms of 
transaction costs: fixed transaction costs, that is the specified investments made in setting up institutional 
arrangements, and variable transaction costs, i.e. costs that depend on the number or volume of transactions. 
Professor James D. Gwartney and Richard L. Sroup define transaction costs as the time, efforts and other 
resources necessary to search for, negotiate and carry out an exchange.6 
Based on existing definitions, the concept of transaction costs for the purposes of this study has been defined 
most generally as “the costs of time and financial resources needed to enter, operate in or get out of 
business which result from the regulatory framework and the interaction of firms with public 
institutions”. 
II. Business regulations and transaction costs 
In an interview for ISNIE Newsletter,7 Ronald Coase said: "The relation of economics and law is the most 
interesting part of New Institutional Economics. Unfortunately, that part of the relationship of 
economics and law which analyses the legal system has gone ahead much more than that part of the 
subject which deals with the effects of the legal system on the economic system. That is to say, what 
people have done is to use economics to study the legal system rather than discuss how changes of the 
law affect the actual way the economic system operates". 
Being in full agreement with Professor Coase's statement, I intend to highlight the link between existing business 
regulations, their enforcement and the transaction costs of firms in Bulgaria. 
                                                 
5 Eggertsson continues: "When information is costly, various activities related to the exchange of property rights 
between individuals give rise to transaction costs. These activities include: 
1. The search for information about the distribution of price and quality of commodities and labour inputs, and the search 
for potential buyers and sellers and for relevant information about their behaviour and circumstances; 
2. The bargaining that is needed to find the true position of buyers and sellers when prices are endogenous; 
3. The making of contracts; 
4. The monitoring of contractual partners to see whether they abide by the forms of contract; 
5. The enforcement of a contract and the collection of damages when partners fail to observe their contractual 
obligations; 
6. The protection of property rights against third-party encroachment - for example, protection against pirates or even 
against the government in the case of illegitimate trade." 
6 See James D. Gwartney and Richard L. Sroup, What Everyone Should Know About Economics and Prosperity, 1993. 
7 Spring 1999 Issue. 
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Over the period 1998-1999 only, the Bulgarian Parliament passed 314 laws. According to IME experts, 107 of 
those legal instruments affect directly or indirectly the public sector growth.8 
Although the Rules of Organisation and Work of the Bulgarian Parliament provide for a regulation impact 
assessment to be made of every bill, no such assessments are carried out in practice. As a result, many 
regulations in the country give rise to transaction costs and, even worse, these costs are often 
completely unnecessary or hidden. Numerous instruments of primary or secondary legislation could be used 
as examples here but let us take only two of them: the Law on Re-denomination of the Lev and Ordinance No. 4 
of 16 February 1999 on Registering and Reporting Sales in Commercial Outlets. 
The Law on Re-denomination of the Lev9 is a very good example for such hidden or irrational transaction costs. 
In 1997, an amendment to the Commercial Code required all limited liability companies, joint-stock ventures and 
commandite partnerships with shares to increase their fixed capital. The existing companies of these three forms 
were obliged to bring their capital into line with the new statutory minimum and notify this change to the 
Commercial Register. Only 10 months later, the Law on Re-denomination of the Lev put the same companies 
under an obligation to notify the Commercial Register of the changes in their capital resulting from the re-
denomination of the domestic currency.10 That obligation was enacted despite the explicit provision of s. 2, subs 
3 of the Law on Re-denomination of the Lev that "re-denomination shall take place by operation of law and shall 
not necessitate any express statement on behalf of the individuals or entities affected thereby". The view that the 
second notification (resulting from the re-denomination) would be free as the Law on Re-denomination 
(paragraph 5(2)) read that no stamp duties and fees for publication in the State Gazette would be collected, was 
more than groundless. Those fees form only small part of a company's transaction costs. According to the 
Commercial Code, the capital of a company of one of the three types mentioned above must be changed by 
resolution of the General Assembly of members (shareholders). The resolution must be put down in minutes on 
the basis of which an application is filed with the Company Division of the competent court to enter the change in 
capital in the Commercial Register. The costs of convening11 and holding a General Assembly meeting, and for 
preparing and filing the required documents amounted to at least 6,062,632 Levs.12 In other words, the "free-of-
charge" re-denomination of the capital cost Bulgarian companies 0.03% of the GVA in the country's economy in 
1999. The Law on Re-denomination was passed during the Kosovo crisis when it was already clear that the 
                                                 
8 See IME, Legal and Legislative Reform: Impact on the Private Sector, IME Newsletter, issue March-July, 2000. 
9 By virtue of the Law on Re-denomination of the Lev, as from 5 July 1999 the Bulgarian Lev was denominated, with 
1,000 old Levs equalling 1 new Lev. 
10 See paragraph 5, Transitional and Final Provisions. 
11 In the event of a public limited company and commandite partnership with shares, the general assembly of 
shareholders is convened by an invitation published in the unofficial section of the State Gazette. Every such 
publication cost 22,500 old Levs.  
12 The amount was calculated based on NSI data on average monthly wage in the country in 1999 - 205 Levs. The number 
of active commercial companies in the same year was 44,516 limited liability companies; 27,328 single-member limited 
liability companies, 5,324 joint-stock companies, 667 single-member joint-stock comp anies; 7 commandite partnerships 
with shares. Other factors taken into account in making the calculation were the minimum legal fees prescribed by 
Ordinance No. 1 on the Minimum Fees of Barristers (issued by the Supreme Council of the Bar), and the minimum 
rentals for halls where the meetings of the general assemblies took place. For further details on the methodology of 
calculations see Yordanka Gancheva and Ivaylo Maznev, Firm Costs to Remove the Zeros, Capital Weekly, 20 June 
1999. 
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Bulgarian economy would suffer losses. Likewise, after June 1999, it was crystal-clear that GDP had gone down 
by 0.6-0.7% in the first quarter of 1999, and many economists were sceptical about the ability of the economy to 
catch up. Then, was it logical at all to spend funds equal to 5% of the decrease already registered in 
order to carry out an entirely formal operation? 
In addition, re-denomination brought about other direct transaction costs, e.g. the recalculation of all accounting 
entries in new Levs, compulsory accountancy closing as at 5 July 1999, resetting all accounting software 
applications and all tills with fiscal memory,13 etc. Finally,  all companies were bound to display the prices of their 
products parallely in old and new Levs until the end of 1999 which meant, if not large money outlays, at least 
higher costs in terms of time and efforts. 
The above-described transaction costs caused by the re-denomination were not only devoid of any rationale. 
They also amounted to a clear-cut loss of firms' resources that could have been spent on other operations, 
including investments. 
Another example along the same lines is the Ordinance on Registering and Reporting Sales in Commercial 
Outlets.14 Section 2 of that instrument reads that every individual or entity subject to tax registration and carrying 
out sales of goods or services in a commercial outlet, as defined in the Ordinance, must register and account for 
those sales by way of issuing till receipts from a fiscal device, unless payment is effected by bank transfer. 
As a matter of fact, the till devices with fiscal memories proved to facilitate nothing else but the work of and 
control by the fiscal authorities. The installation of those devices entailed myriad of unnecessary transaction costs, 
e.g.: 
 Section 36 of the Ordinance obliged each firm to have a service maintenance contract with an authorised 
company. This resulted into absolutely useless transaction costs. The price of service maintenance varies 
between 20 and 240 Levs per year. In reality, however, this is the price of the contract itself which is 
entered into solely with the aim to avoid the fine under s. 48 of the Ordinance  which is from 500 to 
2,000 Levs. The prevailing practice is that service maintenance contracts do not include regular checks of 
the till devices and any repairs outside the warranty period or in the event of non-recognition of the 
warranty must be paid separately. In brief, the entrepreneurs do not pay in order to obtain a service in 
future but in order to get hold of the document itself; 
 Section 4, subs 2 of the Ordinance obliged the persons with an average daily turnover exceeding 500 
Levs (over a three-month period15) to acquire and register a back-up fiscal device that should be used, if 
the main device is out of order or under repairs. This means that every entrepreneur must own a back-up 
till device and enter into a service maintenance contract for that device as well, though he might never use 
                                                 
13 By calculations of the Institute for Market Economics, only the resetting of the tills with fiscal memory cost nearly 2 
million  new Levs. 
14 Ordinance No. 4 of 16 February 1999 on Registering and Reporting Sales in Commercial Outlets, issued by the Minister 
of Finance, publis hed SG, issue 16 of 23 February 1999, amended, issue 55 of 18 June 1999, in force as from 5 July 1999, 
amended and supplemented, issue 113 of 28 December 1999, issue 4 of 14 January 2000, supplemented, issue 16 of 25 
February 2000, in force as from 25 February 2000. 
15 Except for outlets, where liquid fuels are on sale. 
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it. Besides, if the permit to use both the devices is not renewed five years later, the entrepreneur will have 
to purchase and install two new devices. This requirement is in fact unnecessary, as the entrepreneur is 
entitled to issue cash receipts from a stub certified by the competent tax service in the event of power 
failure or if the electric till is under repairs;16 
 According to s. 13, subs 3 of the Ordinance, the certificate of worthiness of the type of fiscal device shall 
be issued for a period of 5 years and there is no guarantee that it will be renewed on expiry. Thus, a fiscal 
device, though perfectly worthy and well-functioning, would have to be changed five years later if the 
permit for its use is not renewed. Let us not forget that the cheapest fiscal devices cost 250 Levs and this 
not an immaterial expense for small merchants like most of the sellers at stalls and tables in the street. The 
existing requirements virtually encourage the transfer of operations into the "shadow" sector. 
The table below compares the mandatory particulars of primary accounting documents (as laid down in the Law 
on Accounting) and the particulars of a fiscal till receipt required by Ordinance No. 4: 
No. Particulars of primary accounting 
documents required by the Law on 
Accounting (s. 8) 
Particulars of fiscal till receipt required by the Ordinance on Registering 
and Reporting Sales in Commercial Outlets, (s. 23, subs 2) 
1 Title of document Text "fiscal till receipt" 
2 Name, address and tax number of issuing 
enterprise 
— Name, registered office and address of management of issuing 
enterprise; 
— Tax number and BULSTAT number of person/entity in question 
3 Name, address and tax number of 
enterprise with which the economic 
operation is carried out and names of its 
representative 
 
4 Place and date of issuance; — Name and address of commercial outlet; 
— Sequential number of till receipt; 
— Date of issuance; 
5 Christian and family names of the 
persons having issued document; 
Name and number of cashier/teller 
6 Grounds and subject matter of the 
economic operation 
 
7 Description and value of economic 
operation 
— Name, quantity and price by type of goods or services purchased; 
— Total purchasing price. 
8 Signatures of the persons in charge of 
carrying out and documenting the 
economic operation. If primary 
accounting documents are issued by 
way of automatic processing and the 
primary accounting information is not 
stored in a paper format, the signatures 
are to be replaced with identification 
codes. 
— Name and number of cashier; 
— Individual numbers of the fiscal device and the fiscal memory. 
9 Seal of enterprise (when invoices for 
sales are issued) 
 
Section 11 of the Law on Accounting stipulates that an accounting document not containing all the particulars 
listed in the Law cannot be used as evidence. The table clearly shows that the sole data missing in a fiscal till 
                                                 
16 Section 37 of the Ordinance lays down the following time limits for repairing fiscal devices: 2 working days in cities and 
4 working days in villages; if the fiscal memory needs to be repaired, the duration of repair works should not exceed 5 
days. 
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receipt are those about the recipient and the grounds and object of the economic operation (a seal can be affixed 
to a till receipt as well). In return, the fiscal receipt contains far more data about the issuer of the document and 
this is much more important in the event of a tax audit than, say, the grounds or type of economic operation. 
Nevertheless, a fiscal till receipt does not meet the requirements of the Law on Accounting and, hence, cannot be 
used as evidence. 
If this is added to the examples given earlier, it becomes much easier to see the absurdity of the prevailing portion 
of transaction costs incurred by merchants under Ordinance No. 4. It is also much clearer that this Ordinance 
obviously has no other purpose, but facilitate the fiscal authorities. 
Another example of unnecessary and illogical transaction costs is supplied by Ordinance No. 2 on Categorisation 
of Tourist Outlets. Section 10, subs 6 thereof provides that if a tourist outlet changes hands, the new owner must 
file an application for the award of category following the general procedure laid down in the Ordinance. This 
means that the acquirer must pay a fee between 200 and 2,000 Levs on average (if the outlet is a hotel or another 
accommodation facility) or between 90 and 1,100 Levs (when it is a catering or entertainment). With all due 
respect, I fail to grasp the idea behind this procedure. The requirement gives rise to nonsensical costs since, if an 
outlet has once been awarded a category, this means the outlet meets the conditions laid down for that category 
and this has nothing to do with the owner. A five-star category is awarded to a hotel, not to its owner! Why 
should then the new owner apply again so that the same outlet to be given a category? 
The temporary effect of various permits issued by the Administration is another serious source of costs. For 
example, Ordinance No. 2 (quoted above) says that a certificate of the category awarded to an outlet shall be 
issued for a period of three years. If the owner continues to carry out tourist operations in the outlet thus 
categorised, he must file, before expiry of the three-year period, an application for the outlet to be categorised 
anew under the general procedure. In other words, the owner - again - pays a fee and submits copies of 
documents at least 30% of which establish unchangeable facts, e.g. the BULSTAT registration number and the 
permit to use the outlet. Such transaction costs could be regarded as quasi-taxes and the entrepreneurs often 
resist their burden by way of tax avoidance and evasion. 
Frequently enough, the legislative rules transfer costs of applying and enforcing the existing 
regulations to the entrepreneurs themselves. An impressive abundance of examples to that effect can be 
found in all instruments providing for the issuance of different licenses and in numerous other acts. Thus, the 
Ordinance on Ceiling Prices of Medicinal Products Permitted for Consumption in the Event of Retail Sales 
introduces a ceiling price for any medicinal drug to be complied with by the manufacturer, plus fixed profit 
margins for wholesalers and retailers. However, the costs of registering the "ceiling price" are transferred mainly 
onto entrepreneurs. A manufacturer must file an application for registration of this price at the Commission on 
Drug Prices with the Ministry of Public Health and justify his request at his own expense. As the Ordinance 
requires that the maximum price quoted by a manufacturer should not exceed the lowest registered price in a 
Member State of the Council of Europe, the applicant must study prices registered in all thouse countries and 
provide the Commission on Drug Prices with the relevant information. A manufacturer is entitled to change 
registered ceiling prices not more than twice in a calendar year, getting through the same procedure laid down for 
the initial registration. Those statutory requirements go counter to any market logic. Along the same lines, 
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subsections 1 and 4 of s. 9, which are just ten lines apart from each other, are mutually contradictory. 
To be more precise, s. 9, subs 1 provides that within 14 days as from receipt of the proposal made by the 
Commission on Drug Prices, the Minister of Public Health shall issue an order to register the ceiling price or 
refuse registration while stating reasons. Out of the blue, however, subsection 4 provides that the failure of 
the Minister to pronounce within the time limit set by the ordinance shall be deemed a tacit refusal. No doubt, the 
reader would see here the same conundrum as me: how could a tacit refusal be tacitly reasoned?!? 
We could also add the fact that according to s. 9, subs 2, the Minister of Public Health may by derogation 
register a ceiling price higher than the lowest price registered in a Member State of the Council of Europe. In this 
case, both the total inconsistency of the Ordinance, and the discretionary powers of the Executive come to the 
fore. The Ordinance fails to list the cases in which a derogation is to be allowed. Hence, the administration is able 
to make decisions on a completely discretionary basis and those decisions could be influenced in all sorts of 
manners, bribery being one the best known. 
This Ordinance is just one example of how imperfect and inconsistent regulations can impede the 
process of enforcement, corrupt the environment and push up the transaction costs of the firms 
operating in the country. 
Further to a detailed review of the existing legislation which affects business environment in Bulgaria, the following 
main groups of transaction costs were identified as stemming from the existing legal rules and the interaction with 
the bodies of public administration: 
1. Firm registration costs; 
2. Costs to obtain a license, permit for or registration of the business to be carried on; 
3. Operating costs relating to: 
 legislative amendments; 
 access to lending; 
 search for and supplies of needed raw materials, goods and services; 
 office maintenance and product marketing; 
 labour market and social security legislation; 
 audits / inspections and reporting; 
 payments to the Treasury; 
4. Contractual costs (entering into and performance of contracts); 
5. Transformation and exit costs. 
III. Methodology 
After the groups of transaction costs were identified, a questionnaire was compiled with a view to estimating 
these costs. In order to provide a sound basis for comparison, some of the questions asked in the survey 
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conducted by IME in 1996 were repeated17 (let us remind that the survey of 1996 remains the only attempt to 
date to estimate transaction costs in Bulgaria). 
The working definition adopted in the beginning and many of the other existing definitions of transaction costs 
were used to divide the questionnaire into four sections: 
A. Entry costs; 
B. Operating costs; 
C. Contractual costs (entering into and performance of contracts); 
D. Transformation and exit costs. 
Interviews were conducted with 80 micro-firms and 40 small firms in 21 district centres of Bulgaria.18 The 
number of firms in the different towns was determined pro rata to the total distribution of small and medium-sized 
businesses throughout the country. 
The sectors surveyed included light industry, trade and services, and my choice was based on the following 
considerations: 
— by data  of the Unified State Registry of Economic Units (BULSTAT) there are 538,161 active 
economic entities in the country; 82% of them deal with, respectively, production (6%), trade (53%) and 
services (23%); 
— by NSI data, the share of the three sectors in the gross value added in the private sector was 73% in 
1999. 
Based on data from the National Statistical Institute on the number, sectoral structure of and employment in small 
and medium-sized enterprises in Bulgaria, the sample was prepared for the sociological poll. 
Table 1 shows the number of firms interviewed by sector, town and number of employees. 
Table 1 
 Number of firms interviewed 
Total 120 
Prevailing business sector 
Production 32 
Trade 70 
Services 18 
Town 
Sofia 21 
Large district centre (Plovdiv, Varna, 
Bourgas, Rouse, Pleven) 
36 
Smaller town 63 
Number of employees 
                                                 
17 Respondents were 108 owners of private firms in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna and Silistra. The sample was extracted on an 
accidental basis with a subsequent balancing to take account of the structure of the economic sectors (based on data 
of the National Statistical Institute), and is representative of the private firms in these cities. 
18 Interviewed were 120 representatives of private firms in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Bourgas, Rouse, Pleven, Assenovgrad, 
Kazanluk, Doupnitsa, Turgovishte, Gabrovo, Pazardzhik, Silistra, Shoumen, Smolian, Kurdzhali, Vidin, Yambol, 
Haskovo, Dobrich and Stara Zagora. 
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Micro-firms (1 to 9 employees) 78 
Small firms (10 to 49 employees) 39 
The units of measurement most frequently used in the analysis are "percentage", "arithmetical mean" and "median". 
The percentage shows the portion of interviewees having answered a question in a given manner. In some cases 
the total exceeds 100% as several answers were allowed. 
The arithmeticalal mean is an mean value of the valid cases, whereas the median is a middle value with an equal 
number of values below and above it in a given set of values, e.g. number of licenses, number of days spent, 
number of visits to various institutions, etc. The median corresponds to the fiftieth cumulative percentage and is 
appropriate in sets with highly variable values (or standard deviations). Unlike the arithmetical mean, the median 
neutralises the effects of the highest and the lowest values. 
IV. The sociological poll: results analysis   
The results of the sociological poll are divided in the same sections as the questionnaire and, for the sake of 
clarity, bear the same titles. 
IV.A. Entry costs 
The entry transaction costs may be divided into two main groups: 
— firm registration of the merchant, 
and 
— obtaining a permit to carry on the business. The permit is labelled differently depending on the type of 
business.  
 
IV.A.1 Firm registration of merchant19 
For the purposes of this study, "firm registration of the merchant" is taken to mean the process starting with 
booking a business name at the National Statistical Institute and ending with entry in the tax register. 
The data from the sociological poll shows that the process of firm registration takes 15 days on average. If an 
intermediary intervenes, the period is reduced immaterially to 14 days, instead of 15. The maximum period of 
registration - with or without intermediary - mentioned in a response was 90 days, while the minimum period was 
                                                 
19 For the purposes of this report "merchant" denotes any entrepreneur carrying out by occupation any of the activities 
listed in s. 1 of the Commercial Code, viz.: purchase of goods or other chattels for resale either in their original form or 
after processing or treatment; sale of goods manufactured by the merchant; purchase of securities for sale; commercial 
representation and agency; brokerage, shipping and transport transactions; insurance transactions; banking and 
foreign exchange transactions; bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques; warehousing transactions; licensing 
transactions; supervision of goods; intellectual property transactions; hotel, tourist, advertising, information, 
programming, impresario and other services; purchase, construction or furnishing of real estates for sale; leases. 
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1 day. The minimum period stated in one of the answers is absolutely unrealistic. There is no possibility 
whatsoever for a company to go through all steps of the procedure described below for just one day. 
Firm registration takes most time in Sofia, less time in large district centres and least time in small towns (see 
Table 2). The firms interviewed in this sample were registered between 1988 and 2000, with 1993 being the 
statistical median. 
Table 2: How did you register your firm and how many days did that take?: Responses grouped by town. 
Without intermediaries: 
how many days? 
Total Sofia Large District 
Centre 
Smaller Town 
Arithmetical mean 21.74 days 31.4 days 22.93 days 18.51 days 
Median 15 days  30 days  20 days  10 days  
Minimum 1 day    
Maximum 90 days    
Valid cases 81 11 27 43 
Through an intermediary: 
how many days 
    
Arithmetical mean 19.68 days 30.9 days 21.67 days 11.0 days 
Median 14 days  25 days  30 days  7 days 
Minimum 1 day    
Maximum 90 days    
Valid cases 34 10 9 15 
The period differs substantially from town to town. This most probably is due to the different workload of the 
institutions involved in the process of firm registration. The poll also reveals dispersion by sector. Those 
differences however, differ from case to case and do not depend on a particular sector since, as we would see 
later, the process is the same for the firms in all economic sectors. 
The procedure of a merchant's firm registration is governed by the Commercial Code, the Law on Statistics, the 
Code of Tax Procedure and Order No. 1 of 12 January 2000 laying down the Procedure and Conditions for 
Tax Registration.20 It consists of five main steps: 
1. Booking a name at the National Statistical Institute; 
2. Delivery of a judgement by the Companies Division of the competent court to enter the firm in the 
Commercial Register. 
Documents required:  application for registration21 
3. Registration in the BULSTAT Registry. 
Documents required:  copy of court judgement. 
4. Registration as an insurer at the National social security Institute. 
Documents required:  copy of court judgement; 
  copy of BULSTAT registration  
certificate. 
                                                 
20 Issued by the Director General of the General Tax Directorate with the Ministry of Finance, published, SG, issue 6 of 21 
January 2000, in effect from 1 January 2000. 
21 The application for registration must be accompanied by various documents, depending on the type of merchant; all 
these documents are listed in the Commercial Code. 
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5. Tax registration at the Territorial Tax Administration. 
Documents required:  copy of court judgement; 
    copy of BULSTAT registration 
certificate; 
    declaration for tax registration. 
The procedure after the registration at court must close within 7 days as from receipt of the court judgement. The 
institutions involved must be visited only in the sequence prescribed and each next institution is given copies of the 
documents issued by the previous institutions. The lack of co-operation and co-ordination in the work of the 
different bodies of public administration actually turns the entrepreneur into a courier linking those bodies and 
entails unnecessary time costs. 
Reviewing the legislative rules on firm registration, some inconsistencies become clear-cut and they prompt the 
following questions: 
v Why should the merchant copy the court judgement for registration of the firm X times and submit it to 
each public institution as many times as he requests a service? Section 5 of the Commercial Code22 
provides that the Commercial Register of the Court shall be public, so all parties and institutions 
concerned have access to it; 
v Why should the BULSTAT identification card (which certifies the BULSTAT code) be copied Y times 
and a copy be left to each public authority visited? According to ss. 42 and 43 of the Law on Statistics: 
 The information in the BULSTAT Registry shall be public, as far as it is derived from documents 
for the formation or setting up, transformation or winding up of economic operators; 
 The National Statistical Institute must provide the authorities of central and local administration 
with free-of-charge access to the public information contained in the BULSTAT Registry. Such 
access is provided within 3 days as from entering the relevant information in that Registry; 
 The National Statistical Institute must ensure a daily free-of-charge access to the information 
entered in the BULSTAT register to the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the 
Ministry of Finance, the National Social Security Institute and to other agencies determined by a 
decision of the Council of Ministers. 
v Why should the merchant, at his visit to the territorial tax administration, submit copies of the court 
judgement and of the BULSTAT registration certificate, if: 
 According to s. 45 of the Code of Tax Procedure: 
— the tax authorities must receive free-of-charge information from any court and public registers 
concerning the tax payers, including those tax payers whose court registration is struck out; 
                                                 
22 Section 5: "Everyone shall have the right to inspect the Commercial Register and the documents on the basis of which 
the entries therein have been made, and to receive copies therefrom." 
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— the courts, municipalities, Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works, National 
Statistical Institute and the Ministry of Interior must provide the tax administration, on a free-of-
charge basis, with the existing information necessary to keep the Registry. 
v Similarly, the legal ground according to which a merchant is required to register as an insurer at the 
National Social Security Institute seems to be fairly obscure. Until 1 January 2000 that registration was 
governed by Title III of the Labour Code (1951). The old Labour Code, however, was repealed when 
the Code of Compulsory Social Security came into effect. At present, the registration in question is 
carried out either without a legal ground or, if a legal ground exists at all, it is certainly an administrative 
instrument which has not been published. Under the Code of Compulsory Social Security, the insurer's 
code shall be the BULSTAT code. When registering at the National Social Security Institute, however, 
every firm is assigned - just in case - a file number which, of course, differs from the BULSTAT code. 
The process of firm registration is connected with costs of time and financial expenses for State fees, fees for legal 
advisers, the elaboration of a firm seal, etc. The poll shows that the average outlay in respect of firm registration 
amounts 100 Levs. In analysing the results in this particular case we have used the statistical median, as the 
figures quoted by the respondents – 5,000 or 6 Levs (registration without intermediary), and 500 Levs or 1 Lev 
(for registration through an intermediary) - represent unrealistic maximum and minimum values and distort the 
arithmetical mean. 
The figures in Table 3 show that the registration costs are highest in Sofia and lower in  smaller towns and in the 
district centres, respectively. As the State fees are the same within the country, these differences are most 
probably due to different service fees charged in different areas. 
Table 3: Responses to the question How did you register your firm and how much did it cost? 
Without intermediary: 
How much did it cost? 
Total Sofia Large district 
centre 
Smaller town 
Arithmetical mean 211.12 Levs 151.33 Levs 128.78 Levs 286.20 Levs 
Median 100 Levs  190 Levs  90 Levs  100 Levs  
Minimum 6 Levs    
Maximum 5000 Levs    
Valid cases 59 6 23 30 
Through an intermediary: 
How much did it cost? 
    
Arithmetical mean 157.08 Levs 275.00 Levs 206.25 Levs 115.13 Levs 
Median 140 Levs  275 Levs  155 Levs  70 Levs  
Minimum 1 Lev    
Maximum 500 Levs    
Valid cases 25 2 8 15 
The table also shows that, on the whole, resort to intermediaries still makes the procedure dearer (which was also 
the case in 1996). The price actually goes down solely in smaller towns where the personal and family 
connections of an intermediary and his friendships play a major part. 
As we have seen, the transaction costs at this stage of entry are mostly costs of time, rather than financial costs, 
and stem primarily from the inconsistent legislative framework and the lack of co-operation among the various 
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administrative bodies. 
The costs of time could be substantially reduced by putting in place an information network linking the units of 
public administration. That would ensure a rapid and easy access to any public register and would make 
unnecessary the visits to any other institution after the court. 
III.A.2 Obtaining a permit to start up the operations 
The start-up permit is the second stage of entry. More often than not, the legislation relative to this stage is 
irrational and inadequately enforced. 
Most governments in the world require entrepreneurs to comply with certain criteria, in order to start up some 
types of operation. Government regulation is justified by the need to protect the health of citizens, quality, national 
security or what is commonly referred to as "the public interest". Achieving these goals by way of government 
regulation, however, has its alternative price: compliance with the procedures and requirements burdens the 
entrepreneurs with costs of time23 and financial expenses . As a result, some firms fail to enter the market in 
question. 
Any arrangements of this sort, regardless of whether they are labelled "licensing", "certification", 
"co-ordination" or "registration", represent entry barriers. On the whole, they produce the same 
economic result: restricting competition and increasing the cost of doing business in a given sector, 
thus reducing market efficiency and, as a repercussion, the economic growth. 
The Bulgarian legislation in force distinguishes among several different legal terms, such as: "license", "permit", 
"certificate", "approval", etc. These terms, however, are similar from an economic point of view: they all mean a 
document required by a legislative or statutory instrument and issued by a State or private institution to anyone 
willing to carry on a certain business. For the sake of clarity, again, all those concepts with similar economic 
content will be referred to hereinafter as licenses. 
The following table displays the sharp increase in the range of activities for which licenses or permits were 
required over the period 1989-1999. 
Table 4 
Year Newly-introduced licenses Existing licenses 
1989 2 2 
1990 4 6 
1991 3 9 
1992 1 10 
1993 5 15 
1994 6 21 
1995 21 42 
                                                 
23 An experiment made by Hernando de Soto in 1983 in Lima, Peru, demonstrated that compliance with all legislative 
requirements and procedures to open a small textile mill, without paying (many) bribes or using political connections, 
took the team involved in the experiment 289 days. See: Hernando de Soto, The Other Path (1989). 
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1996 13 55 
1997 10 65 
1998 21 86 
1999 20 106 
Sources: Calculations of the Institute for Market Economics 
The data above shows that in the period 1997-1999 only the number of activities for which license was required 
doubled. The introduction of more requirements in 1998 and 1999, however, has been repeatedly excused by 
claiming that this is the result of the harmonisation of Bulgarian legislation to the acquis communautaire.24 
It is quite logical then, that 73% of the entrepreneurs interviewed responded that their business requires a license 
or permit. The average number of licenses required is 2 (2 for production and trade, and 1 for services). (See 
Table 5). 
 
 
 
Table 5: Responses to the question “How many licenses and permits are required for your business?” 
 Total Production Trade Services 
Arithmetical mean 5.48 13.47 3.57 1.31 
Median 2 2 2 1 
Minimum 1    
Maximum 200    
Valid cases 83 19 51 13 
  Sofia Large district centre Smaller town 
Arithmetical mean  2.75 10.93 2.89 
Median  2 3 2 
Valid cases  12 27 41 
Here again, there is a huge difference between the median and the arithmetical mean as a result of the large 
standard deviation. Thus, for the purposes of analysis we should work with the statistical median. 
The maximum number of licenses mentioned in a response was 200. This is unrealistic, as no business in Bulgaria 
requires such a number of licenses. The response rather expresses the opinion of the respondents of the unusually 
high number of licenses required as a whole. 
A total of 88 firms responded to the question "Who deals with preparing and lodging the documents required 
to obtain a license or permit?". In 73 of them the owners themselves did the preparation and filing work, 
whereas 15 firms prepared and lodged the documents through intermediaries. Generally, the involvement of 
intermediaries accelerates the process of issuing a license, though in Sofia the trend is reverse. Perhaps, this is the 
                                                 
24 For further details see Licensing Requirements in Retail and Wholesale Trade and Commercial Road Transport, IME 
Newsletter, issue January-February 2000. 
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reason why only two respondents in Sofia had resorted to intermediaries, whereas in large district centres and in 
smaller towns the firms using intermediaries were respectively 6 and 7. 
The average time spent to prepare and lodge the documents for the license is 20 days (without an intermediary) 
or 7 days (through an intermediary). The maximum number of days indicated was 365 and the minimum number 
was 1. (See Table 6). 
Table 6: Costs of time (in days) for drafting and lodging documents for licenses, by sector and by town. 
Total cost of time for 
preparing and lodging 
documents 
Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Without intermediary        
Arithmetical mean 36.40 64.78 26.96 27.8 27.2 48.35 31.83 
Median 20 18.5  20 30 25 30 17.5  
Minimum 1       
Maximum 365       
Valid cases 73 18 45 10 10 23 40 
Through 
intermediary 
       
Arithmetical mean 23.17 2 28.4 15.3 45 20.83 18.86 
Median 7 - 13.5  13.5  45 13.5  7 
Minimum 2       
Maximum 90       
Valid cases 15 1 10 4 2 6 7 
The big differences between median and arithmetical mean reveal the great variety of values given in the 
responses. The biggest dispersion is found in respect production and in large district centres. 
The dispersion in the number of days by inhabited area and by sector could hardly be surprising, given the logic 
and the nature of Bulgarian licensing regulations.  
The licensing procedure could be conditionally divided in two stages: applying for a license and obtaining a 
license. 
Applying for a license is the process of collecting and lodging the documents required to issue a license. The 
time of preparing and lodging differs due to the different number of documents required in each case and, last but 
not least, to the large degree of administrative discretion allowed by Bulgarian licensing arrangements and the 
obscure powers of the authorities in charge of enforcing the various regulations. 
A few examples could be invoked here: 
· As regards the obtaining of a license for trade in tobacco and tobacco products, a statutory instrument25 sets 
out the number and type of documents required and the carrying out of the licensing procedure is entrusted to 
the municipal administration. On the grounds of s. 22 of the Law on Local Self-government and Local 
                                                 
25 Rules Implementing the Law on Tobacco and Tobacco Products. 
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Administration26 and s. 8 of the Law on Legislative Instruments27, the municipal authorities fairly tend to 
expand, at their own discretion, the list of documents required (see Table 7). 
                                                 
26 Section 22 (1): "The municipal council shall adopt, on issues having local significance, rules, ordinances, decisions and 
instructions which shall be forwarded to the Provincial Governor within seven days." 
27 Section 8. "Every municipal council may issue ordinances to regulate, in compliance with higher ranking legislative 
instruments, those social relations of local significance which are not governed by the higher-ranking instruments in 
question."  
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Documents to be filed for license for trade in tobacco and tobacco products28 
No. Students' Borough Mladost Borough Lozenets Borough Samokov Municipality Septemvri Municipality Statutory Requirements 
1 Standard application form Standard application form Standard application form Standard application 
form 
Standard application form Standard application form 
2 Court registration  Original document or copy 
authenticated by notary 
public for applicant's court 
registration 
 Court judgement Original document or copy 
authenticated by Notary Public 
for applicant's court 
registration 
3 Outlet registration 
certificate issued by 
Students' Borough 
Outlet registration 
certificate 
Documents proving that 
outlet meets the 
requirements of the Borough 
possibly imposed by order of 
the Mayor 
  Documents proving that outlet 
meets the requirements of the 
respective borough possibly 
imposed by order of the mayor 
4 Criminal record certificate      
5  Certificate for current 
status of firm 
 Certificate for current 
status of firm 
Certificate for current 
status of firm 
 
6 Sanitary permit by 
Hygiene Inspectorate for 
trade with alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco 
products  
   Sanitary permit  
7 Certificate by tax service 
for taxes and fees paid 
Document for fee paid Certificate by territorial tax 
directorate in the area of 
applicant's registered office 
for outstanding debts to 
State Treasury 
Certificate by territorial 
tax directorate for 
outstanding debts to 
Treasury; cash receipt 
for rental paid under a 
lease contract with the 
municipality 
Document for taxes paid Certificate by territorial tax 
directorate in the area of 
applicant's registered office for 
outstanding debts to Treasury. 
8  BULSTAT  Copy of identification 
card based on the 
BULSTAT Registry 
BULSTAT  
No. Students' Borough Mladost Borough Lozenets Borough Samokov Municipality Septemvri Municipality Statutory Requirements 
9 Tax registration  Document for applicant's tax 
registration 
Copy of tax 
registration certificate 
Tax registration Document for applicant's tax 
registration 
                                                 
28 The requirements are presented in the form in which they are shown on the premises of the respective municipality. 
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10 Existing lease contract or 
title deed 
     
11 Declaration that 
applicant: 
a) is not disqualified to 
carry on trade in wine, 
alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco products; 
b) shall label the products 
in way to avoid any 
misleading impression 
of their origin, quality, 
category or type  
     
12   Conclusion by 
corresponding municipal 
technical service as to the 
lawful use of outlet in 
accordance with Law on 
Regional and Town Planning 
and its Implementing Rules 
Documents for putting 
outlet in operation in 
accordance with Law 
on Regional and Town 
Planning, its 
Implementing Rules, 
Ordinance No. 6 
Permit to use site issued 
by Directorate of National 
Construction Supervision 
Conclusion by corresponding 
municipal technical service as 
to the lawful use of outlet in 
accordance with Law on 
Regional and Town Planning 
and its Implementing Rules 
13   Proposal to approve outlet 
working hours in line with 
public order requirements 
  Proposal to approve outlet 
working hours in line with 
public order requirements 
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Some of the documents to be lodged (e.g. certificate of firm's current court registration status, certificate from the 
territorial tax administration of outstanding debts to the Treasury, criminal record certificate, sanitary permit, 
conclusion of municipal technical department on the lawfulness of using the outlet, etc.) are issued in time limits set 
in different instruments. Because of the level of discretion allowed by the legislation and the non-extant practice of 
punishing the officials for failure to comply with statutory time limits, in some cases the actual time limits depend 
entirely on the government official in charge of applying the instrument in question. 
· Another example is s. 26, subs 1 of the Rules Implementing the Law on Public Health. It provides that the 
State sanitary supervision authorities shall issue permits and give conclusions in writing within 25 days in 
respect of standardising documents, designs of construction sites, legislative instruments and design and 
construction norms, or within 10 days in all other cases. In both cases, however, the respective time limits 
start running from the submission of the full set of documents and provision of any additional documents if 
such additional documents were requested. There is no deadline by which such additional documents could 
be requested. In other words, the officials of the institution in charge could turn the period of 25 days into a 
term to their liking. 
The general overview of licensing arrangements in Bulgaria shows that in almost all such arrangements the time 
limits within which entrepreneurs should act are fixed scrupulously , whereas various loopholes enable the 
administration to extend its own time limits. This is the reason why some entrepreneurs manage to collect the 
requested documents for one week and others need a year to do so. 
A further element, which makes the time limits for filing the required documents so, different is the power of the 
licensing bodies (proclaimed by the respective legislative instruments) to request supplementary documents in 
addition to those prescribed by the legislation. The example with s. 10 of Ordinance No. 2 on Categorisation of 
Tourist Outlets resembles that one with the Rules Implementing the Law on Public Health. Section 10 of the 
Ordinance stipulates that the categorising authorities are entitled to also request "other information and 
documents to check data and circumstances relative to the categorisation procedure". The entrepreneur 
applying for the award of category should submit the documents requested within a certain time limit. However, 
there is no time restriction on the categorising authority to request additional information. For that reason the filing 
of documents for the purpose of categorising a tourist outlet could take anything from 2 to 20 days. 
Obtaining a license is the process from receipt of the documents until the permit for carrying on the business is 
issued. It also depends both on the statutory time limits and on the work of the particular administration in charge 
of applying the legislative arrangements. This stage of the licensing process is also characterised by a large degree 
of administrative discretion and by statutory possibilities to extend the time limits. Section 11 of Ordinance No. 2 
on Categorisation of Tourist Outlets (quoted above) provides that the time limit for categorisation shall be 4 
months but it starts running after all documents listed in s. 10 of the Ordinance have been filed. Section 10 refers 
inter alia to "other information and documents" which the categorising authority can request. There is no deadline 
by which such additional information could be requested. Thus, the starting point of the 4-month time limit 
remains unclear. 
Section 34 of the Law on Gambling is another story. It provides that the inspections and inquiries in connection 
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with applications to issue permits for organising games of chance must be finalised by the Directorate General for 
Control of Gambling from 3 to 6 months as from receipt of the written application. However, "in exceptional 
cases and by a reasoned decision of the State Commission, this time limit may be extended to 12 months." 
Yet another example is Ordinance No. 6 on Authorising the Use of Construction Sites in the Republic of 
Bulgaria. It "sets out" time limits in the procedure for issuing a permit to use the sites after construction or 
reconstruction. According to the Ordinance, the time limit for the work of the State Acceptance Commission is 
10 days but, based on a reasoned report from the chairman of the Commission, the period could become 30 
days and in exceptional cases the work may be suspended for a period determined by the authority having 
appointed the Commission. The Ordinance does not define the concept of "exceptional circumstances" nor does 
it list the reasons that could justify an extension. Hence, any extension is entirely conditional on the subjective 
assessment of the public officials. 
The question “How long did it take until you got your license?” was not asked in this study, as the different 
statutory time limits for issuing various licenses would distort the general information in terms of both arithmetical 
mean and median. In order to establish the specific period in which the licenses are obtained, a separate study 
should be carried out of each particular license. In order to get adequate information, we asked the entrepreneurs 
if they had encountered any administrative delays when starting up their business. Against the backdrop of 
everything we have described so far in terms of licensing procedures and legislative framework, it would hardly 
be surprising that 32% of all firms interviewed answered in the affirmative. The administrative delay for the sample 
amounts to 30 days on average, with 240 days being the maximum. The delay is most significant in the field of 
services (60 days) followed by trade (30 days) and production (15 days). As regards the comparison by town, 
both the arithmetical mean and the median show unambiguously that the institutions in Sofia are the slowest. There 
is a huge dispersion in the answers, due to the individual nature of the problems encountered in each particular 
case (see Table 8). 
Table 8: Was there any administrative delay in starting up your business and if yes, how big was it? 
Days Total Production Trade Services 
Arithmetical mean 51.34 16.43 62.5 48.0 
Median 30 15 30 60 
Minimum 0    
Maximum 240    
Valid cases 38 7 24 7 
Days  Sofia Large district 
centre 
Smaller town 
Arithmetical mean  54.09 48.5 51.24 
Median  40 30 30 
Valid cases  11 10 17 
The administrative delay in starting up a business most often results from the long statutory time limits for obtaining 
a license which, in turn, depend on the following procedural obstacles: 
1. Too many institutions are involved in the licensing process. They must all be visited in a strict sequence, 
and every next institution issues its permit or license on the basis of certificates issued by the preceding 
institutions. It is impossible to visit the institutions in parallel and the conclusion of one body must be 
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obtained before proceeding to the next body. At the same time, there is an ubiquitous failure to comply 
with the statutory time limits for issuing certificates, permits, licenses and approvals by the public 
administration which is caused by a variety of reasons - starting from those envisaged in the legislation 
(requesting additional documents or requiring rectification in submitted documents) and ending with the 
absence of the official in charge, the lack of time to write the document or even the lack of paper to put 
the text on. If we add the fact that most institutions involved do not have computer equipment, the delays 
in the whole process become easy to explain and even logical; 
2. The data from poll shows that, in order to obtain a license, one must submit 10 documents on average, 
with 7 being the statistical median. The largest number of documents is required in the sectors of services 
and trade and the smallest number is required for production. The surveys of the Institute for Market 
Economics have shown that, for example, to issue only licenses for trade in cigarettes and alcoholic 
beverages, some municipalities require a total of 28 documents to be submitted (while 11 documents are 
required by the legislation). Another example is the practice of the State Commission for Gambling which 
requires the submission of 29 documents before it issues a permit for organising gambling machine games. 
In this sense, the maximum number of documents indicated in the answers - 47 - is not exaggerated, but 
the minimum number - 1 - is completely unrealistic. 
3. To obtain all these documents, one should visit 5 institutions on average (maximum 30 and minimum 1). 
80 entrepreneurs had to visit those institutions 7 times on average, with the largest number of visits being 
30 and the smallest number being 1. As regards the number of institutions visited and the number of visits, 
there are no explicit differences by town or by sector. The main reason for these numerous visits lies in 
the unclear rules and the restricted access to information as to what exactly should be done and how. For 
57.5% of the entrepreneurs interviewed, the main source of information had been "the colleagues having 
trodden the same path", while 41.7% had to ask questions personally to an official of the respective 
institution. These facts suggest that: the procedures are not clear, nor are they easily accessible to 
potential licenses applicants. Only 32.2% of those interviewed relied on the sample documents affixed on 
the wall in the building of the respective institution. This is easy to believe, given the appearance and 
contents of such requirements and samples seen during the field work. As a matter of fact, the samples 
often contain instructions that can only be complied with after further explanation, e.g. "and other 
documents depending on the type of site" or "etceteras" and so on, and so forth. (See Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Responses to the question Where did you get information about the necessary documents to  
be submitted for carrying on your business, such as permits, licenses, certificates and the like? (more 
than one response allowed) 
Valid percentage YES  
Sources of information on documents 
required 
Total Production Trade Services  
State Gazette 42.5 63.2 34.5 46.2 
Samples shown in the building of municipal 
administration or another public authority 
32.2 21.1 36.4 30.8 
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Information received from an official of the 
institution on request 
41.7 52.6 34.5 53.8 
Colleagues having trodden the same path 57.5 36.8 63.6 61.5 
No sources of information used 1.1 0 1.8 0 
Other sources  17.2 26.3 16.4 7.7 
  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
State Gazette  46.2 48.1 38.3 
Samples shown in the building of municipal 
administra tion or another public authority 
 46.2 48.1 19.1 
Information received from an official of the 
institution on request 
 61.5 33.3 40.4 
Colleagues having trodden the same path  38.5 66.7 57.4 
No sources of information used  0 0 2.1 
Other sources   7.7 14.8 21.3 
It is clear that people in Sofia rely mostly on the information given by officials of the respective institution and least 
on information given by "colleagues having trodden the same path". The explanation is that many licenses are 
administered locally, so there are as many internal instructions and regulations for issuing licenses as there are 
boroughs in Sofia. Thus, it is crucial to obtain first-hand information in order to keep the number of visits to 
various institutions to the possible minimum. 
Unlike the residents of Sofia, people in large district centres rely primarily on their colleagues having trodden the 
same path and on exhibited samples. In smaller towns entrepreneurs have advised each other in 57.4% of the 
cases, while 40.4% of the interviewees got information from an official of the relevant institution. Only 19.1% of 
the interviewees  relied on samples. This low percentage is quite logical given that there are usually no samples in 
the smaller towns and information is obtainable only from the competent officials, on request. 
An almost constant percentage of entrepreneurs rely on information published in the State Gazette (app. 42%). 
After the overview of licensing legislation, however, it could be stated that even those entrepreneurs have 
necessarily used at least some of the other sources of information in parallel, since: 
1. Not all administrative instruments governing the process of licensing are public, 
and 
2. The field work shows that in all probability there is no institution strictly abiding by the legislative 
rules that refrains from adding at least one more document or requirement to those laid down by 
law. 
Hence, it is absolutely impossible for a firm to obtain a license only on the basis of the information given in the 
State Gazette. 
In summary, the following main reasons for the long period of obtaining licenses could be identified: imperfect 
legislative framework and discretion of the civil servants in the process of enforcing the applicable legislation; 
compulsory sequence to be followed in the procedure; opaque requirements and poor technical equipment of the 
 24
institutions involved in the licensing process. 
Any delay, regardless of its nature and cause, increases both the costs of entering the business29 and the benefits 
lost. One possible way out of this situation is to start operating without a license but in this case there is always 
the threat of sanctions or racketeering by the supervisory authorities. Another solution is to bribe an official in 
order to accelerate the process of licensing and start legal operations as soon as possible. The choice depends on 
the financial standing of the entrepreneur concerned and on his preparedness to run risks. 
The question "Did you have an opportunity to operate before all required licenses, permits, etc. had been 
issued?" was answered in the affirmative by 53% of the interviewees. 96% of those respondents actually used 
that opportunity and worked without license for 2 months on average (72 months was the maximum and 0.5 
month was the minimum). The longest period of operations without license was found in the service sector, while 
the shortest was in the trade sector. The important difference between the arithmetical mean and the statistical 
median reveals a huge dispersion in the answers. (See Table 10). 
Table 10: Responses to the question “Did you avail yourself of the opportunity to work without a 
license and, if yes, for how long?” 
Months Total Production Trade Services 
Arithmetical mean 6.55 5.77 6.63 7.57 
Median 2 2 1 4 
Minimum 0.5    
Maximum 72    
Valid cases 37 11 19 7 
  Sofia Large district 
centre 
Smaller town 
Arithmetical mean  2.17 2.65 9.67 
Median  1.5 1.5 2 
Valid cases  6 10 21 
Besides the costs of time, licensing requires financial expenditure. 
The following table shows the total cost of preparing and lodging the documents required to issue a license, in 
days and in Levs. 
Table 11: Cost of preparing and lodging the documents for licensing 
 Total Production Trade Services 
Without 
intermediary 
Days Levs  Days Levs  Days Levs  Days Levs  
Arithmetical mean 36.40 665.71 64.78 346.07 26.96 694.27 27.8 1078.75 
Median 20 15 18.5  175 20 150 30 140 
Valid cases 73 63 18 14 45 41 10 8 
                                                 
29 Regardless of the fact that the business operations have not started, the entrepreneur must: 
— pay the rentals, as he has entered into a lease agreement (this is one of the main documents required by almost all 
licensing institutions);  
— carry out repairs (in order to bring the premises in line with the requirements of the Inspectorate of Hygiene and 
Epidemiology and the National Fire Safety Service) 
- etc. 
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Minimum 1 0       
Maximum 365 15,000       
   Sofia Large district centre Smaller town 
   Days Levs  Days Levs  Days Levs  
Arithmetical mean   27.2 116.0 48.35 1408.48 31.83 256.14 
Median   25 120 30 200 17.5  150 
Valid cases   10 5 23 23 40 35 
 Total Production Trade Services 
With intermediary Days Levs  Days Levs  Days Levs  Days Levs  
Arithmetical mean 23.17 816.31 2 150 28.4 464.67 15.3 2093.33 
Median 7 200 - - 13.5  200 13.5  30 
Valid cases 15 13 1 1 10 9 4 3 
Minimum 2 0.00       
Maximum 90 6,250       
   Sofia Large district centre Smaller town 
   Days Levs  Days Levs  Days Levs  
Arithmetical mean   45 1300 20.83 1243.33 18.86 110.4 
Median   45 1300 13.5  150 7 150 
Valid cases   2 2 6 6 7 5 
The dispersion in the responses is tremendous. The maximum price indicated for preparing and lodging 
documents for licensing is, 15,000 Levs without intermediary and 6,250 Levs through an intermediary, while the 
minimum value in both cases is zero. Thus, in order to eliminate the impact of the highest and lowest values (which 
are apparently unrealistic) the statistical median should be used for the purposes of this analysis. 
The data in the table shows that now, quite like in 1996, intermediaries make the process of licensing 
more expensive as a whole. Intermediaries in Sofia are least efficient as they delay the first stage of the process 
by 20 days and push the price up by 1,180 Levs. The highest prices for preparing and lodging the documents are 
found in the sector of production, with trade and services coming next. If an intermediary interferes, production 
and trade change place. 
Table 12 displays the types of expenses incurred by firms to obtain the license. The state fees form the largest 
portion of these expenses, followed by technical and advisory services. This correlation remains unchanged, if we 
analyse the situation by town. 
 
Table 12: Specific Expenses Incurred to Obtain Licenses 
Specific expenses 
for licenses 
and/or permits  
Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
State fees        
Arithmetical mean 305.25 219.23 278.81 550 192 397.85 262.34 
Median 100 100 100 150 100 100 100 
Valid cases 63 13 41 9 5 26 32 
Minimum 5       
Maximum 3500       
Technical services        
Arithmetical mean 98.54 139.17 67.14 147.5 75 96.15 107.2 
Median 65 100 45 150 75 40 80 
Valid cases 24 6 14 4 2 13 9 
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Minimum 5       
Maximum 300       
Legal and consulting services        
Arithmetical mean 73.2 120 82.94 23.83 150 65.58 74.42 
Median 30 50 30 20 - 30 27.5  
Valid cases 25 3 16 6 1 12 12 
Minimum 2       
Maximum 500       
Other       
Arithmetical mean 560 - 730 50 2000 150 45 
Median 100 - 150 - - - 45 
Valid cases 4 0 3 1 1 1 2 
Minimum 40       
Maximum 2000       
The conclusion is that the present study would be of some help not by calculating the arithmetical 
mean of entry costs in terms of time and money but by identifying the underlying reasons for these 
costs. That could enhance any further efforts to minimise such costs in future. 
The huge dispersion in the answers is particularly disturbing. It means that the entry transaction costs are different 
for firms operating in the same sector and based in the same town. The difference of the start-up costs would 
affect the prices over the first months after starting up. It will decrease the price competitiveness of those firms, 
which have started later, and in return for higher costs as a result of the administrative discretion allowed by 
Bulgarian legislation. 
III.B. Operating costs 
The following significant operating costs incurred by companies have been identified: 
 costs resulting from legislative amendments; 
 costs relative to the access to lending; 
 costs of searching for and finding the needed raw materials, goods and services; 
 costs of office maintenance and  marketing the products, goods or services; 
 labour market and social security costs; 
 costs of debts to the Treasury; 
 costs relating to audits / inspections and reporting. 
III.B.1 Costs resulting from legislative amendments 
These could be most diverse, e.g. costs of labour, taxes, customs duties, licenses, etc. In the section on Business 
Regulations and Transaction Costs we have already referred to the lack of preliminary impact assessment of 
regulations in Bulgaria. This entails frequent legislative amendments, which, in turn, force firms incur numerous 
extra expenses. The frequent amendments to business regulations make the environment highly volatile and often 
tip the balance towards operating "in the shades".  
Table 13 exhibits the year of adoption and the number of amendments to the basic legislative instruments 
governing the business environment. The data is so articulate that they simply need no commentary. 
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Table 13 
 CC LA LTP / 
CTP 
LC LHI CCSS LC 
old/new 
RILC 
old/new 
LVAT 
old/new 
RILVAT 
old/new 
LE 
old/new 
RILE 
old/new 
LPAYET 
/ LPIT 
RILPA
YET 
Decree 
56 / 
LPT / 
LCIT 
RI 
Decree 
56 / 
LCIT 
LLTF 
old/new 
Before 
1991 
   5   8 4   8  33   3 26 
1991 1 1  3    2   2  3   7 1 
1992 1 1  4    4   2  2   4  
1993 2 1 2     3 1  1  1   2 1 
1994 1       4  2 1/1 1 2 1  2  
1995 1   2    3 1 2 2 1 2 3  2 2 
1996 5 3 1 3     3 1 3 4 5 3 2 3/1 7 
1997 3 1 3 1    5 3 1 1 1 2/1 1 4/1 3 1/1 
1998 4 1 2 6 3  2/3 1/2 5/1 3 3  3  3  4 
1999 7 4 1/1 3 6 1 2 1 6 2 1 3 3  8  1 
2000  1 2  1 2 1 1 1 2       1 
91 - 00: 25 13 12 22 10 3 8 26 21 13 17 10 24 8 18 24 19 
Key to abbreviations: 
CC Commercial Code  LE Law on Excise 
LA Law on Accounting  RILE Rules Implementing the Law on Excise 
LTP Law on Tax Procedure  LPAYET Law on Pay-As-You-Earn Tax 
CTP Code of Tax Procedure  LPIT Law on Personal Income Taxation 
LC Labour Code  RILPAYET Rules Implementing LPAYET 
LHI Law on Health Insurance  LPT Law on Profit Tax 
CCSS Code of Compulsory Social Security  LCIT Law on Corporate Income Taxation 
LC Law on Customs   RI Decree 56 Rules Implementing Decree No. 56 
RILC Rules Implementing the Law on Customs   RILPT Rules Implementing the Law on Profit Tax 
LVAT Law on Value-added Tax  LLTF Law on Local Taxes and Fees 
RILVAT Rules Implementing LVAT    
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In this section we will dwell in more detail on the costs that entrepreneurs must incur as a result of legislative 
changes affecting already issued licenses without which the firms are not entitled to operate. The other costs 
mentioned in the brief list above will be tackled in other sections of the report. 
The review of licensing regulations has shown that many of the licenses - acquired with so many efforts - are in 
fact temporary, as their term of validity is somewhere between 1 and 5 years. If there are any permanent licenses, 
these also should be renewed from time to time because of legislative amendments. The question “How many 
times did the legislative provisions governing your operations change?” prompted answers in the range of 3 
times on average.30 The maximum number of times indicated - 100 - is unrealistic, but it shows how irritated the 
entrepreneurs are of the frequent changes in the legislation. 42% of the interviewees were not disturbed at all by 
those changes, but 22% had to apply for a new license; 30% had to introduce make changes in their outlet or site 
to meet the new requirements, while 7% had to change their operations in general. 
Legislative amendments cause firms to suspend their business for an average period of 33 days per year. Such 
period was identified by the service sector - 72 days; trade comes second with 31 days and production comes 
last with 8 days. The maximum period of suspended activities indicated in the poll was 730 days, that is nearly 2 
years. 
Legislative amendments entail not only costs of time, but also financial expenditure. According to the data from 
the poll, every such change costs the firms 200 Levs annually on average. (see Table 14). 
Table 14: Responses to the question “How much did each of those changes cost (per year)?” 
 Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Arithmetical mean 3461.2 333.3 5748.62 261.1 116.67 9091.77 605.0 
Median 200 Levs  25 Levs  200 Levs  200 Levs  50 Levs  60 Levs  200 Levs  
Valid cases 50 12 29 9 3 17 30 
Minimum 0.00       
Maximum 100,000       
The data in tables 12 and 14 shows, that the biggest costs of time and money are incurred in the sectors of 
services and trade. This is probably attributable to the fact that legislative amendments tend to affect these two 
sectors far more often as compared to production. 
 
 
 
III.B.2 Costs relative to access to lending 
                                                 
30 To take one example, out of many, just the ordinances on issuing licenses for trade in alcoholic beverages have been 
amended 9 times since 1993 to date. 
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The lending operations of Bulgarian banks are still fairly limited. Since the beginning of 2000, we have seen some 
increase in the loans granted, but this is mainly due to foreign lending programmes serviced by Bulgarian banks.31 
That is to say that the bulk of the capital with which Bulgarian entrepreneurs start up, both in 1996 and now, are: 
first, private savings; second: informal loans (granted by friends and relatives), and, third: family chattels or real 
estate or inherited property. (See Table 15). 
Table 15: Responses to the question “Where did the main part of your start-up capital come from?” 
(More than one answer allowed) 
Valid percentage 
YES 
Total 
1996 
Total 
2000 
Production 
2000 
Trade 
2000 
Services 
2000 
Private savings 45.4 79.8 81.3 78.6 82.4 
Family chattels or 
real estate / inherited 
property 
15.7 18.5 15.6 21.4 11.8 
Bank loans 13.0 7.6 18.8 4.3 0 
Assistance from 
friends (relatives) / 
informal loans 
21.3 29.4 9.4 38.6 29.4 
Others 4.6 10.1 12.5 7.1 17.6 
The table needs no explanation: while 13% of starting businessmen used bank loans in 1996, the percentage in 
2000 hit a low of 7.6%. 
The limited number of entrepreneurs using bank loans is due, both to reluctant lending by the banks, and to the 
attitude of entrepreneurs to this form of funding. 
On the one hand, the relation between loans granted to the real sector and the total assets of the banking system 
dropped from 35.4% in mid-1997 to 28.3% in May 1999.32 The conduct of banks in terms of lending policies 
derives from several factors:33 
 commercial lending is deemed to be too risky as the business environment has not improved substantially 
and the risk in the real sector remains relatively high; 
 most investment projects are not characterised by outstanding quality; 
 the financial results of firms shown in their financial statements are lower than the real figures - in fact most 
firms maintain a system of "double accounting", in order to decrease their profit tax exposure; 
 the rights of creditors are far from being adequately protected. The procedure for collecting default loans 
is slow and very problematic. 
On the other hand, many entrepreneurs do not feel confident of the business environment in Bulgaria and, hence, 
are unwilling to run the risk of taking a loan. 
                                                 
31 See the study of IME on Business Pursuit Conditions in Bulgaria, February 2000. 
32 See Assenka Yonkova, Financial Markets Development as an Incentive for Economic Growth, Banks, Investments, 
Markets, issue 2, 2000. 
33 Idem. 
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For the same reasons, only 34.2% of the entrepreneurs interviewed have used loans in carrying on their business. 
The actual percentage is highest in the production sector - 50%, followed by trade - 30%, and services - 22.2%. 
Small enterprises resort to loans twice more often than micro-firms. 
Table 16 makes it clear that the structure of the loans has remained unchanged since 1996: 
Table 16 
(More than one answer allowed) 
Valid percentage 
YES 
Total 
1996 
Total 
2000 
Production 
2000 
Trade 
2000 
Services 
2000 
State-owned bank 36.6 46.3 62.5 38.1 25.0 
Private bank 17.1 24.4 18.8 19.0 75.0 
Friends and family 41.5 41.5 43.8 38.1 50.0 
Inter-firm lending 
(deferred payments 
to partner firms) 
4.9 19.5 18.8 19.0 25.0 
Now, like in 1996, the loans used are primarily one-year, with a maximum term of 5 years and a minimum term 
of 6 months. The interest rate amounts to 15.5% on average, with 110% indicated as a maximum and 0% shown 
as a minimum. The huge dispersion in the answers is also due to the diverse structure of the loans and to the fact 
that they were obtained in different years. 
Nearly 66% of the firms interviewed had to provide guarantees for the loan. 71.4% used as guaranty real estate, 
25% movable property, and 22.2% used bank guarantees. 
The interviewees managed to obtain loans in two ways: either on their own, or through an intermediary. In 33, out 
of 40, firms, which used loans, a representative of the firm dealt with the lending procedure and that cost 10 days 
on average. 7 firms used the services of an intermediary which shortened the period of obtaining the loan by 3 
days (See Table 17). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17: Responses to the question How much time did you spend to obtain a loan? 
Without 
intermediary 
Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Arithmetical mean 38.73 27.4 46.3 26.0 77.6 30.75 32.2 
Median 10 10 12.5  30 7 22.5  12.5  
Valid cases 33 10 20 3 5 8 20 
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Minimum 0       
Maximum 365       
With 
intermediary 
       
Arithmetical mean 6.43 14.0 1.0 0 7.0 10.0 2.67 
Median 3 7 0 - - 0 3 
Valid cases 7 3 3 1 1 3 3 
Minimum 0       
Maximum 30       
The process is slowest in the service sector, and in large district centres. 
The period of obtaining a loan is extremely important. The longer it is, the higher transaction costs the firms incur, 
and the larger benefits they lose as a result of delayed payments.34 
The procedures for receiving a loan cost on average 195 Levs without an intermediary and 500 Levs, if an 
intermediary is involved. The maximum registered amount in both cases is 30,000 Levs whereas the minimum is 
zero. (See Table 18). 
Table 18: Responses to the question “How much money did it cost to obtain the loan?” 
Without 
intermediary 
Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Arithmetical mean 2,560.00 4,374.29 2,159.29 196.67 10,000 1,012.50 2,889.33 
Median 195 50 440 240 - 200 150 
Valid cases 24 7 14 3 1 8 15 
Minimum 0       
Maximum 30,000       
With 
intermediary 
       
Arithmetical mean 4,928.57 10,500.00 1,000.00 0 30,000 333.33 1,166.70 
Median 500 1,000.00 0 - - 0 500 
Valid cases 7 3 3 1 1 3 3 
Minimum 0       
Maximum 30,000       
The large dispersion in the periods of obtaining a loan and the price of loans stems from the normal differences 
from one loan transaction to another. 
Because the capital market in the country is underdeveloped, only 3 firms - out of 120 interviewed - used direct 
funding, which differs from a securities issue or debt-equity swap. Table 19 shows the structure of direct funding 
by sector and by town. 
Table 19: Structure of Direct Funding 
Valid percentage YES  Total Production Trade Service
s  
Sofia Large 
district 
centre  
Smaller 
town  
                                                 
34 For example: paying a higher price because of expiry of the deadline of a preferential offer; rentals for warehousing 
facilities due to unpaid customs duties and excise; penalties under existing contracts, etc. 
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Subsidies from State 
funds 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Grants from State-
owned enterprises  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Grants from private 
individuals 
50.0  50.0  50.0  0 0 0 50.0  
Grants from private 
foundations 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Debt-equity swap 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Securities issue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 50.0  50.0  50.0  0 0 0 50.0  
In contrast to the poll carried out in 1996, when 4.5% of the interviewees faced supplementary conditions - in 
addition to the interest - when obtaining direct or indirect funding, none of the entrepreneurs participating in this 
poll faced such additional conditions. 
In conclusion, the access to direct and indirect funding does not give rise to high transaction costs for the firms. 
However, this access is too restricted due to the low supply of loans and the underdeveloped capital market in 
the country. The unstable business environment increases the risk for banks, on the one hand, and makes the 
entrepreneurs reluctant to resort to loans, on the other hand. 
III.B.3 Costs of searching for and finding the needed raw materials, goods and services 
42 out of 120 firms interviewed manufacture goods. 83.3% of them are able to find the necessary raw materials 
on the official market, 4.2% find these materials on the unofficial market, while 5.8% buy materials on both 
markets. This proportion is more or less the same as in 1996. The largest portion of raw materials obtained on 
the unofficial market is in the production sector - 12.5% . This is due to the largest price differentials between the 
two markets there. 
To the question "Are there any differences between the prices of raw materials, goods and services on the 
official and unofficial market?" the following answers were received: 36.7% respond that the difference 
amounted to nearly 50%, and 1.7% claim that the difference exceeds 100%. The data shows that the largest 
differences in the prices on the two markets exist in Sofia, on the one hand, and in the sector of production, on 
the other hand. 
50% of the 42 firms interviewed find the necessary raw materials and obtain them straight from the manufacturer, 
30% use intermediaries, only 2.5% use services on the Internet, while 10.8% combine the first three options. 
It takes 2 days on average for firms to get information on where to find raw materials, goods and services. The 
maximum period indicated was 120 days. Average periods do not differ by sector or by town. 
Finding the relevant information costs firms 45 Levs on average, with substantial differences existing by town and 
by sector. (See Table 20). 
Table 20: Responses to the question “How much money do you spend to find raw materials / 
supplies?” 
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Levs  Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Arithmetical 
mean 
301.28 241.47 402.27 32.78 65.00 415.92 263.45 
Median 45 75 50 10 75 20 50 
Valid cases 60 17 34 9 7 24 29 
Minimum 0       
Maximum 5,000.00       
The supply of raw materials and goods takes 2 days on average. The average period in Sofia, though, is much 
longer - 7.5 days. The maximum period indicated for supply was 240 days. 
The direct financial expenditures of firms for the supply of raw materials and goods is 80 Levs on average, with 
supplies for the production sector being the most expensive - 250 Levs. The maximum direct cost of supply 
indicated in a response was 15,000 Levs. 
75.8% of the entrepreneurs interviewed think that the price of raw materials, goods and services differs 
depending on whether an intermediary is involved or not. 5.8% deem that supplies through an intermediary are 
cheaper. The other 70% find that involving an intermediary makes supplies 10 to 100% more expensive (see 
Table 21). 
Table 21: Responses to the question “Does the price of raw materials / goods/ services differ 
depending on whether an intermediary is involved or not? “ 
Percentage Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Cheaper through 
intermediary  
5.8 9.4 4.3 5.6 9.5 11.1 1.6 
No difference 8.3 6.3 10.0 5.6 4.8 5.6 11.1 
Intermediary: 10% 
more expensive 
30.8 21.9 40.0 11.1 23.8 30.6 33.3 
Intermediary: 10-
20% more 
expensive 
29.2 34.4 27.1 27.8 33.3 41.7 20.6 
Intermediary: 20-
50% more 
expensive 
8.3 9.4 5.7 16.7 14.3 2.8 9.5 
Intermediary: 50-
100% more 
expensive 
1.7 3.1 0 5.6 0 0 3.2 
n/r 15.8 15.6 12.9 27.8 14.3 8.3 20.6 
In conclusion, the costs of time and money in finding and procuring supplies of raw materials and goods are huge 
and could be substantially reduced if the information exchange on the market is improved. It is fairly abnormal to 
spend 2 days to obtain information on where to find the necessary materials or goods. The business associations 
and the chambers of commerce could be particularly helpful in this respect by facilitating the access of 
entrepreneurs to commercial information. On the other hand, entrepreneurs must realise how important it is to 
provide up-to-date information to all registers related with their operations. They must be fully aware that they are 
in fact the first beneficiaries of having up-to-date information in the existing data banks. 
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III.B.4 Costs of office maintenance and costs of marketing the products, goods or services 
The total office maintenance costs include items, such as rentals, telephone expenses, electricity and heating 
expenses. For 75% of the firms interviewed, these costs amount to between 5 and 25% of the total revenues. 
However, 8.3% of the firms claim that the office maintenance costs amount to somewhere between 50 and 
100%. This could mean either of the following two things: 
— either these firms are extremely inefficient and it is impossible to explain how they avoid going bankrupt, 
or 
— which is in fact more probable, the entrepreneurs interviewed are not fully aware of the amount of these 
costs. Most small and medium-sized businesses in Bulgaria are simply unaware of the concept of 
financial management. Many owners, managers and chief accountants are not familiar with the 
percentage share of various firm expenses. This is due, inter alia, to the lack of understanding about the 
importance of this information and to the huge number of reports, statements, declarations and 
registrations which are required by the State35 and are extremely time-consuming for the entrepreneurs. 
The largest percentage of such firms is present in the sector of trade, and in Sofia (See Table 22). 
Table 22: Responses to the question “What percentage share of your total revenues do you spend on 
office maintenance costs (rentals, telephone etc.)?” 
Percentage Total 
1996 
Total 
2000 
Production Trade Service
s  
Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Up to 5%  45.4 18.3 31.3 14.3 11.1 9.5 19.4 20.6 
5 - 15% 21.3 32.5 21.9 35.7 38.9 38.1 27.8 33.3 
15 - 25% 13.9 24.2 31.3 18.6 33.3 19.0 27.8 23.8 
25 - 50% 15.7 15.0 9.4 20.0 5.6 9.5 16.7 15.9 
50 - 100%  8.3  3.1  11.4  5.6  23.8  8.3  3.2  
Over 100% 3.7  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
n/r  1.7 3.1 0 5.6 0 0 3.2 
The above data reveals a significant increase in the office maintenance costs since 1996. In 1996, nearly half the 
firms maintained their offices against more or less 5% of their total turnover. In 2000, however, the majority of 
firms maintain the offices against 5 to 25% of the turnover. The fact that the office maintenance costs of 3.7% of 
the interviewees exceed 100% clearly shows that the financial management problems are far from being new. 
Quite like in 1996, the costs of marketing a product in 2000 amount to 20% of its selling price on average (See 
Table 23). 
Table 23: Responses to the question “What percentage of the total selling price of your goods/services 
do you spend on marketing?” 
                                                 
35 See below, Audits / Inspections and Reporting. 
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Percentage Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Arithmetical mean 34.61 38.23 33.86 29.62 36.94 37.5 32 
Median 20 25 25 10 25 27.5  20 
Valid cases 102 30 59 13 16 34 52 
Out of all 120 firms interviewed, 84.2% market their products mostly directly to the consumer, 12.5% use mostly 
intermediaries, and none resorts to electronic commerce. The highest number of firms using intermediaries is in the 
sector of production (25%). 
It is quite logical, then, that 73% of the marketing costs are linked to intra-firm payments and 20% to external 
payments. 
Table 24 contains the costs most frequently incurred in marketing the product. The percentages in the table in fact 
show the percentage of firms having responded that they incur such costs when marketing their products. 
Table 24 
Valid percentage Total Production Trade Services  
     
Labour 83.3 84.4 85.7 72.2 
Office maintenance 
(telephone, 
electricity, water, 
etc.) 
82.5 90.6 80 77.8 
Transport costs  81.7 81.3 88.6 55.6 
Rentals  66.7 71.9 67.1 55.6 
Insurance and 
security 
38.3 43.8 37.1 33.3 
Advertising 36.7 50 31.4 33.3 
Market surveys 33.3 56.3 24.3 27.8 
Commissions cash 22.5 34.4 18.6 16.7 
Representative 
expenses (dinners, 
meetings) 
15.8 21.9 14.3 88.9 
The largest number of firms responded that their marketing costs include labour costs, office maintenance costs, 
transport costs and rentals. These four elements are the same by town and by sector, with one strange exception: 
in the service sector, 88.9% of the entrepreneurs interviewed said that representative costs were part of product 
marketing costs. 
Given the specific operations in the three sectors under review, we could say that the distribution of firms having 
identified the remaining product marketing costs is completely logical. 
Table 25 shows the percentage of firms which indicated a particular cost as the highest of all the costs. 
Table 25 
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Valid 
percentage 
"Highest 
cost" 
Total Production Trade Service
s  
Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smalle
r town 
        
Rentals  42.5 21.7 57.4 20 35.3 53.6 37.1 
Labour 39 55.6 25 69.2 38.9 30.3 44.9 
Market 
surveys 
22.5 22.2 11.8 60 16.7 20 26.3 
Office 
maintenance 
16.2 17.2 17.9 7.1 6.3 14.7 20.4 
Commissions 
cash 
11.1 9.1 15.4 0 20 0 13.3 
Transport 
costs  
10.2 0 12.9 20 20 8.6 8.3 
Advertising 9.1 6.3 13.6 0 14.3 0 15 
Representati
ve 
5.3 14.3 0 0 25 0 0 
Insurance 
and security 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
In general terms, the largest number of firms - 42% - find that rentals are the highest costs they incur. For 39% of 
the firms, the highest costs are connected with labour, for 22.5% the market surveys rank first, and for 16.2% the 
highest costs are attributed to office maintenance. It is impressive that many firms - 11.1% - have indicated as 
highest costs the commissions paid cash, that is to say the bribes. The largest percentage here is found 
accordingly in the sector of trade (15.4%), and in Sofia (20%). This means that corruption gives rise to 
serious transaction costs for a significant number of firms in Bulgaria. 
III.B.5 Costs relating to the labour market and social security legislation 
Table 26 shows the percentage of total revenues spent on labour. 
Table 26 
Percentage Total 
1996 
Total 
2000 
Production Trade Service
s  
Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Up to 5%  37.7 10.0 12.5 11.4 0 4.8 13.9 9.5 
5 - 15% 30.2 25.0 12.5 31.4 22.2 14.3 25.0 28.6 
15 - 25% 19.8 23.3 25.0 24.3 16.7 14.3 25.0 25.4 
25 - 50% 11.3 22.5 21.9 21.4 27.8 33.3 27.8 15.9 
50 - 100% 0.9 9.2 18.8 4.3 11.1 23.8 5.6 6.3 
Over 100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
n/r 0 10.0 9.4 7.1 22.2 9.5 2.8 14.3 
Since 1996, labour costs have been gradually increasing and tend to move to the area above 25%. 
In order for an employee to receive 100 Levs, he or she must work out 176.65 Levs. In other words, the State 
must be paid 76.65 Levs in the form of taxes and social security contributions on every 100 Levs (See Table 27). 
Table 27: Tax and social security burden, 1991-2000 
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Year Average 
monthly 
salary 
(NSI)* 
PAYE %  Pension, 
health 
insuranc
e / 
VTU** 
paid by 
employee 
%  Pension, 
health 
insuranc
e / 
VTU** 
paid by 
employer 
%  Labour 
costs per 
100 Levs 
salary 
Payment
s at the 
expense 
of 
employee 
Payment
s at the 
expense 
of 
employe
r 
           
1991 959 116 12.10%   354.83 37% 155.85 12.10% 37.00% 
1992 2,047 301 14.70%   757.39 37% 160.62 14.70% 37.00% 
1993 3,231 445 13.77%   1195.47 37% 158.88 13.77% 37.00% 
1994 4,960 700 14.11%   2083.20 42% 165.33 14.11% 42.00% 
1995 7,597 969 12.76%   3190.74 42% 162.76 12.76% 42.00% 
1996 14,392 2639 18.34% 288 2% 6044.64 42% 178.25 20.34% 42.00% 
1997 141,640 20208 14.27% 4108 2.9% 59488.91 42% 171.43 17.17% 42.00% 
1998 208,135 35746 17.17% 6036 2.9% 84502.81 40.6% 175.91 20.07% 40.60% 
1999 218,900 33353 15.24% 9851 4.5% 90186.80 41.2% 175.92 19.74% 41.20% 
2000 228 31 13.62% 21 9.0% 83.68 36.7% 176.65 22.62% 36.70% 
* NSI: National Statistical Institute 
** VTU: Vocational Training and Unemployment Fund 
III.B.6 Audit/Inspection and Reporting Costs 
1. Audits 
Every business is subject to the main following types of audits or inspections: 
— tax audits; 
— audits by the National Social Security Institute; 
— inspections in relation to the maintenance of the license; 
— other inspections, e.g. for compliance with labour law, conditions at work, etc. 
According to the poll, tax audits are most time-consuming (in days). They take 3 days on average, with the 
lengthiest audits being those in Sofia - 5 days on average. The maximum duration indicated in a response was 
120 days. 
The direct financial expenses attributed to those audits and inspections are quite different. In the general case they 
amount to zero, but for some firms they could well be as high as 3 200 Levs, with an arithmetical mean for the 
sample 102.58 (See Table 28). These are, most probably, costs relating to the auditor’s stay or paid directly in 
cash in order to ensure him making a compromise. 
The big standard deviation is due to the specificity of each individual audit, the number of documents audited, etc. 
 
Table 28 
Tax audits Total Production Trade Services 
 Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs 
Arithmetical mean 7.93 102.58 6.39 277.14 9.05 29.44 5.54 0 
Median 3 0 5 0 2 0 3.5 - 
Minimum 0 0       
 38
Maximum 120 3,200       
Valid cases 92 45 23 14 57 25 12 6 
  Sofia Large district 
centre 
Smaller town 
   Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs 
Arithmetical mean   18.13 462.86 4.78 15.71 6.72 48.17 
Median   5 0 3 0 2 0 
Valid cases   15 7 31 14 46 24 
The audits of the National Social Security Institute must establish the compliance with the Code of Compulsory 
Social Security and its implementing instruments. As we have seen from Table 27, in 1999 the social security 
burden on the employer was 41.20%, that is every paid salary of 200 Levs cost the employer 282.40 Levs. This 
often makes employers try to avoid paying the contributions due. The task of the National Social Security 
Institute is to compare the contributions paid with the amounts due, check the benefits paid for temporary 
incapacity for work, etc. 
The audits from the National Social Security Institute take 1 day on average, with 40 days being indicated as the 
maximum period. The average direct costs of this type of audits also amount to zero but in some firms they reach 
the sum of 320 Levs (See table 29). Interestingly, the maximum direct costs of social security audits are nearly 10 
times lower than tax audits costs. This results from the fact that the social security receivables of the State are 
lower than the corporate taxes due by the firms. There is a unwritten rule that the sum given to the auditor is a 
percentage of the sum that would be paid if the auditor does not make a compromise and refuses to neglect his 
duties. 
Table 29 
Audits by National 
Social Security 
Institute 
Total Production Trade Services 
 Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs 
Arithmetical mean 3.17 23.49 4.25 35.0 2.93 25.0 2.21 0 
Median 1 0 3 0 1 0 2 - 
Minimum 0 0       
Maximum 40 320       
Valid cases 62 33 16 10 37 17 9 6 
  Sofia Large district centre Smaller town 
   Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs 
Arithmetical mean   3.25 25.0 5.03 35.56 2.06 16.94 
Median   2.5 0 1 0 1 0 
Valid cases   8 6 20 9 34 18 
The third type of inspections are those related to the supervision of licensed firms. The licensing of certain types 
of business operations would be meaningless if no one exerts ex-post control to check compliance with the 
qualifying requirements. Hence, 91% of the entrepreneurs interviewed answer in the affirmative when asked "Do 
the competent institutions control your compliance with regulatory requirements by way of inspections?" 
These inspections take 1 day on average. According to the statistical median, the direct costs amount to 0 but the 
arithmetical mean is 21.32 Levs. The maximum duration of such inspections is 60 days, the maximum expenditure 
is 270 Levs and the minimum is 0. Inspections in the production sector cost most time and money, while trade 
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and services come next. As regards the data by town, the inspections are lengthiest in Sofia and most expensive 
in small towns. (See Table 30). 
Table 30 
Inspections for 
compliance with 
licensing 
requirements  
Total Production Trade Services 
 Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs 
Arithmetical mean 3.32 21.32 3.87 30 3.5 18.95 1.56 6 
Median 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Minimum 0 0       
Maximum 60 270       
Valid cases 74 38 16 14 48 19 10 5 
  Sofia Large district 
centre 
Smaller town 
   Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs 
Arithmetical mean   9.8 0 1.78 9.17 2.67 36.84 
Median   1 - 1 0 1 0 
Valid cases   10 7 26 12 38 19 
Other inspections that firms are subject to last 1 day on average, and no large discrepancies exist by sector or by 
town. The statistical median of the expenses is 0 but the arithmetical mean is much higher - 350.31 Levs due to 
the exceptional maximum price indicated at the response (5,000 Levs). 
During the inspections by State administrative authorities, 29% of the interviewees are forced to incur "informal" 
expenses. The distribution of those having paid bribes by town and by sector is almost equal. 
In conclusion, audits and inspections of firms' operations give rise to varying amounts of transaction costs which 
are sometimes especially high. 
2. Reporting 
The data from this poll shows that 85% of the firms keep regular accounting  and only 15% prepare their financial 
statements in a rush before the close of the relevant reporting period. 51.7% of the firms use double-entry book-
keeping, while 33.3% use single-entry book-keeping. 
Compared with 1996, the share of "rush" and single-entry accounting has declined and has given way to regular 
double-entry accounting. 
In most firms (43.3%) the accounting work is entrusted to a special accountant hired under a service contract, or 
to an accountancy firm. In 28.3% of the firms, accounting is entrusted to an accountant employed on a full-time 
basis, while in 20.8% of the cases the accounting work is carried out by the owner or the director. 
The accounting work is done by 1 person on average. In 65.8% of the firms it takes up to 10 days (See Table 
31). 
 40
Table 31 
Percentage Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Up to 5 days 42.5 31.3 41.4 66.7 38.1 38.9 46.0 
5 - 10 days 23.3 12.5 28.6 22.2 23.8 22.2 23.8 
10 - 20 days 11.7 18.8 10.0 5.6 9.5 19.4 7.9 
20 - 30 days 20.0 31.3 20.0 0 23.8 19.4 19.0 
n/r 2.5 6.3 0 5.6 4.8 0 3.2 
According to the Code of Compulsory Social Security, insurers must submit to the National Social Security 
Institute, on a monthly basis and separately for each employee, the following data:  
· income chargeable for social security purposes;  
· amount of contributions for social security, health insurance, for the Vocational Training and Unemployment 
Fund  and for supplementary compulsory pension insurance;  
· amount of social security benefits paid out and working record.  
The filling and submission of declarations containing these data take 2 days on average, with a maximum period 
of 20 days. 
37.6% of the sole proprietors interviewed do not pay sickness benefits or child allowances to their employees. 
60% of those do not pay, because they do not have employees with children under age, 17% because they do 
not hire employees at all, and 3.1% refrain from paying, because of the huge bureaucracy at the National Social 
Security Institute. 
The practice shows that, during the study period, sole proprietors are placed in a particularly disadvantageous 
situation as insurers. Like all other insurers, they also pay monthly social security contributions by bank transfers. 
However, if they claim reimbursement by the National Social Security Institute of sickness benefits and child 
allowances paid out to their employees, the claim must be certified by an inspector of the National Social Security 
Institute and could only then be deposited at the insurer's bank36. This process takes 2 days on average, with 30 
days being indicated as the maximum. 
The maximum indicated periods of interaction with the National Social Security Institute are largely exaggerated 
and rather mirror the negative attitude of entrepreneurs to the bureaucracy and to the work of that institution. 
As a result of various instruments of primary and secondary legislation, Bulgarian entrepreneurs must file 
numerous declarations, statements, etc. 
In addition to the declarations filed with the National Social Security Institute, already referred to, we could list 
the following examples: 
— annual tax return; 
                                                 
36 This situation was changed at the beginning of year 2000.  At the present time sole proprietors are equal in rights to the 
other insurers.  
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— statement of the sums paid under service contracts during the accounting year; 
— annual statistical report; 
— declarations each and every time that a bank account is opened or closed (to be filed with the territorial 
tax administration); 
— declaration of the number of employees and the conditions at work (to be filed at the National 
Employment Service as many times as circumstances once declared have changed); 
— and occasionally other specific papers. 
The filling and submission of all these documents take 4 weeks annually on average. 
III.B.7 Costs of debts to the Treasury 
The debts to the Treasury include primarily: 
— customs duties, fees and excise; 
— VAT; 
— corporate profit tax (sole proprietors pay personal income taxes); 
— health insurance and social security contributions. 
Judging from the answers to the question "What portion of your firm's total revenues is used to cover debts 
to the Treasury?", this portion is indeed large (See Table 32). 
 
 
 
 
Table 32 
Percentage Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Up to 10% 7.5 6.3 8.6 5.6 14.3 0 9.5 
10 - 20% 15.0 21.9 12.9 11.1 14.3 8.3 19.0 
20 - 30%  25.0  18.8  27.1  27.8  23.8  30.6  22.2  
30 - 50%  30.0  34.4  28.6  27.8  38.1  36.1  23.8  
Over 50% 18.3 15.6 20.0 16.7 4.8 25.0 19.0 
n/r 4.2 3.1 2.9 11.1 4.8 0 6.3 
The high amounts of debts to the Treasury makes 27% of the entrepreneurs interviewed attempt to reduce or 
avoid the payment of customs dues, thus saving up to 25% of the outstanding amounts. 11.7% of the 
interviewees keep two accounting systems: a formal one for the tax authorities plus an informal one for their own 
internal use. 
As regards sole proprietors (which are 70.8% of the firms in the sample), their debts to the Treasury in 2000 
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have increased by 15 to 22% as compared to 1999. This results mainly from the increased tax and social security 
burden after the entry into force of the Code of Compulsory Social Security and the increased amount of 
minimum monthly salary in the country (See Table 33). 
Table 33 
Monthly income 
in Levs  
Health 
insurance 
premium 
6%  
Pension 
premium 
32%  
Income 
after 
deduction of 
premiums  
Personal 
income tax 
Net income Total tax 
and social 
security 
burden 
Second half of 1999 
250 15.00 21.44 213.56 34.53 179.03 28.39% 
500 30.00 21.44 448.56 95.63 352.93 29.41% 
750 45.00 21.44 683.56 152.83 530.73 29.24% 
First half of 2000 
250 15.00 80.00 155.00 15.40 139.60 44.16% 
500 30.00 160.00 310.00 55.70 254.30 49.14% 
750 45.00 240.00 465.00 101.10 363.90 51.48% 
Source: Calculations of IME 
Under the Code of Compulsory Social Security, as from 1 January 2000, all persons registered as sole 
proprietors must mandatory pay social security contributions amounting 32% per month. The income for social 
security purposes equals the taxable income declared in the annual tax return but cannot exceed 10 minimum 
monthly wages. The increased level of income chargeable for social security purposes results from the type of 
pension system in the country. At present, the Bulgarian pension system is of the pay-as-you-go type, i.e. the 
contributions paid by today's employees cover the pensions of today's pensioners. The problem stems from the 
adverse proportion between employees and pensioners which is 100:90. In order to make 100 employees to be 
able to support 90 pensioners, either collection should be improved, or the amount of contributions or of the 
chargeable income should be increased. As the National Social Security Institute manages to collect only 75% of 
the contributions due, it regards the increase in the chargeable income as the easiest and painless method of fund-
raising. Thus, the tax and social security burden in 2000 has reached the absurd level of 50% per month. This will 
naturally drive the sole proprietors to concealing their income and transferring a large portion of their operations 
to the grey sector. 
III.C Contractual costs (entering into and performance of contracts) 
The contractual costs could be attributed to several stages: 
1. Costs of preliminary studies of the future partner, unless this is the State; 
2. Costs to participate in public tenders under the Law on Public Procurement; 
3. Costs to prepare, negotiate and enter into contracts; 
4. Costs to ensure contractual performance. 
The poll has shown that Bulgarian firms usually do not engage in studying their partner prior to making a contract. 
Only 6.7% of the entrepreneurs interviewed sought information about their future partners in the Commercial 
Register at the court or at the BULSTAT Registry. This cost them 5 Levs at the minimum and 10 Levs at the 
maximum and the information was obtained for a minimum of 1 day and a maximum of 5 days. Preliminary 
 43
studies are carried out mostly by firms in Sofia and, in terms of sector, by firms in the service sector. 
The non-existing practice of studying the partner in advance probably explains why 81% of the firms prefer to 
enter into contracts with firms they already know. (See Table 34). 
Table 34: Responses to the question “What firms do you prefer to make contracts with?” 
Percentage 
"contracts 
preferred 
primarily with" 
Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Firms we know 81.1  76.5  81.3  100.0  90.0  60.0  95.7  
Popular firms  25.8 16.7 22.7 66.7 25.0 20.0 33.3 
Large firms  20.8 16.7 23.5 0 0 30.8 16.7 
The State 14.3 50.0 0 0 20.0 0 50.0 
No preference 77.4 100.0 64.7 87.5 80.0 66.7 85.7 
Others  33.3 100.0 33.3 0 0 50.0 33.3 
Given the minimum thresholds for public procurements which existed until recently (as set out in s. 7 of the Law 
on Public Procurement),37 it is not surprising that only 9.2% of the firms interviewed have ever participated in a 
public tender (respectively 12.5% in the production sector, 8.6% in the trade sector and  
5.6% in the service sector). The distribution by town is almost the same and larger firms naturally prevail. 
The drafting of the tender documents, the payment of tender guarantees and participation in the tendering 
procedure take 11.5 days on average. Some firms which resorted to additional advice and incurred extra 
expenses needed 12 days more. The average costs of preparing the tender documents is 222.5 Levs and the 
average amount of guarantee is 2,000 Levs. 
The costs of preparing for and participating in a tender amount to 1.5% of the firm's total revenues on average. 
Only in 54.5% of the cases participation in a tender resulted in making a contract. 
In April 2000, a special instrument was adopted, namely the Ordinance on the Award of Public Procurement 
Contracts below the Thresholds laid down in s. 7, subs 1 of the Law on Public Procurement. The Ordinance 
introduced the concept of "small-scale public procurement". It also set out the types of procedure for the award 
of "small-scale" procurement contracts and the ceilings for the contract price, with a maximum amount of 600 
thousand Levs. S. 18 of the Ordinance sets the price of the tender documents which may not exceed the actual 
                                                 
37 Section 7 (1) "The provisions of this Law shall mandatorily apply to the award of public procurement contracts of 
the following value at the date of advertising the procedure, VAT-excluded: 
1. construction contracts under s. 3, subs 1(1): above 600 thousand Levs; 
2. supply contracts under s. 3 (subs 1(2): above 50 thousand Levs; 
3. service contracts under s. 3, subs 1(3): above 30 thousand Levs." 
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expenses incurred in preparing these documents.38 All these measures are expected to lower the costs and 
enable small and micro-business to be more prominently represented in the tendering procedures. 
If a contract is entered into outside the context of public procurement, the preparation for, negotiation of, and 
entering into such a contract need 3 days on average, at an average cost of 30 Levs. The responses are 
characterised by a huge standard deviation. The maximum period indicated was 450 days and the maximum cost 
was 60,000 Levs. Likewise, the median differs substantially by sector and by town. The procedure takes most 
time and most expensive in Sofia. In terms of sector, the procedure is lengthiest in the service sector but is most 
expensive in the production sector. 
Table 35 shows the types of costs incurred to prepare, negotiate and enter into contracts, and the percentage of 
firms having indicated that they incur such costs. 
Table 35 
Valid percentage Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Expenses to study 
partner 
30.0  43.8 24.3 27.8 33.3 38.9 23.8 
Expenses for legal 
drafting of contract 
32.5  43.8 27.1 33.3 14.3 47.2 30.8 
Consulting 
expenses  
20.0 25.0 19.1 22.2 14.3 25.0 19.0 
Commissions cash 19.2 25.0 18.6 11.1 19.0 19.4 19.0 
State fees  40.0  37.5 44.3 27.8 38.1 58.3 30.2 
Others  20.0 21.9 14.3 38.9 23.8 25.0 15.0 
The expenses most frequently incurred are those for State fees followed by legal drafting, and the costs of 
studying the partner. Consulting expenses, commissions paid cash and any other expenses come fourth with 
almost equal percentages. 
Table 36 presents the percentage of firms having indicated a given expense as the highest one in the process of 
preparing, negotiating and entering into contracts. 
Table 36 
Valid percentage 
"highest expense" 
Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Expenses to study 
partner 
50.0  64.3  35.3  60.0  71.4  50.0  40.0  
Expenses for legal 
drafting of contract 
12.8 7.1 15.8 16.7 33.3 0 21.1 
Consulting 
expenses  
20.8 25.0 16.7 25.0 33.3 0 33.3 
Commissions cash 43.5 62.5 30.8 50.0 50.0 28.6 50.0 
                                                 
38 By contrast, s. 36, subs 2 of the Law on Public Procurement provides that the price of tender documents shall be 
determined by the contracting authority. 
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State fees  64.6 33.3 77.4 60.0 37.5 71.4 68.4 
Others  45.8 28.6 50.0 57.1 40.0 55.6 40.0 
The largest number of firms responded that State fees were their highest expense. A slightly smaller number 
placed expenses for studying the partner highest. According to the Report on Bulgaria of Transparency 
International, in 1999 the country ranked 69th in the world in terms of corruption. Nevertheless, a disturbingly 
large number of firms (43.5%) stated that the commissions payable cash were their highest cost. Of course, there 
has been some progress here: in 1996 the figure was 78.8%. 
There is, though, a slight inconsistency, which makes us doubt if all entrepreneurs are really aware of what the 
contractual expenses consist in and how big they actually are. If only 6.7% of the firms sought information from 
the public registers and moreover information is neither expensive, nor time-consuming, why did 50% of the 
interviewees claim they incurred the highest costs in studying the partner? It is hard to believe that 60 out of 120 
interviewed firms maintain investigation departments to inquire about and study their possible partners - they can 
simply not afford it with their average annual turnover of 50,000 Levs. 
As regards the costs to ensure contractual performance, 54.2% of the firms encountered problems with defaulting 
partners. However, 45.8% were in default themselves. In such a case, firms tend to negotiate, rather than refer 
the matter to court. Firms in Sofia are the ones to most often negotiate and warn, whereas firms in small towns 
most often go to court or threaten their partners by using crime organisations. (See Table 37). 
 
 
 
Table 37 
Percentage Total Production Trade Service
s  
Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Problems not 
encountered 
54.2 46.9 57.1 55.6 33.3 55.6 60.3 
Negotiations 18.3 25.0 15.7 16.7 28.6 19.4 14.3 
Warnings 2.5 0 4.3 0 9.5 2.8 0 
Court 1.7  3.1  1.4  0 0 0 3.2  
Resort to security firms  0.8 0 1.4 0 0 0 1.6 
Others  13.3 18.8 10.0 16.7 0 22.2 12.7 
n/r 9.2 6.3 10.0 11.1 28.6 0 7.9 
The extremely low percentage of firms having chosen to refer their disputes to court mirrors the low degree of 
confidence in the judicial system. 
If the partners are in default, the process of ensuring contractual performance takes 15 days on average at an 
average price of 225 Levs. The procedure in Sofia is both slowest and most expensive. (See Table 38). 
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Table 38 
Cost (days and 
money) to ensure 
performance by 
defaulting 
partners  
Total Production Trade Services 
 Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs 
Arithmetical mean 148.93 2775.22 28.79 4,300 92.83 3,003.85 754.6 126.25 
Median 15 225 20 500 12 500 20 127.5  
Minimum 0 0       
Maximum 3,650 24,000       
Valid cases 43 22 14 5 24 13 5 4 
  Sofia Large district 
centre 
Smaller town 
   Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs 
Arithmetical mean   101.42 400 234.82 2,591.67 89.58 4,107.86 
Median   90 500 14 225 10 200 
Valid cases   7 3 17 12 19 7 
The large dispersion in the responses is quite logical. The duration and the cost of the process differ from case to 
case depending on the type of problem, the method of settlement chosen, etc. 
III.D Transformation or Exit Costs 
In a dynamic and frequently changing business environment, such as that in Bulgaria, the costs of transforming or 
leaving the business are also very important. They must be reduced to a minimum in order to enable the firms to 
survive in times of market crises. 
The question "What would you do if the market of your business shrinks dramatically?" was answered 
mostly by "shrinking the administrative and labour costs". The next two choices were "shrinking the external 
marketing costs" and "entering another business sector". (See Table 39). 
Table 39 
(More than one answer allowed) 
Valid percentage 
YES 
Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Shrinking 
administrative costs 
(rentals, telephone 
etc.) 
64.0 71.0 63.2 53.3 60.0 71.4 61.0 
Shrinking labour 
costs  
64.0 67.7 61.8 66.7 75.0 60.0 62.7 
Shrinking external 
costs of marketing 
goods/services  
41.2 48.4 39.7 33.3 35.0 34.3 47.5 
Entering another 
business sector 
42.6 45.2 40.6 46.7 35.0 50.0 40.7 
Liquidation of firm 23.5 12.9 26.1 33.3 20.0 27.8 22.0 
Others  12.3 9.7 14.7 6.7 15.0 5.7 15.3 
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Table 40 shows which of those measures were used in practice and by how many firms 
Table 40 
(More than one answer allowed) 
Valid percentage 
YES 
Total Production Trade Services  Sofia Large 
district 
centre 
Smaller 
town 
Shrinking 
administrative costs 
(rentals, telephone 
etc.) 
60.3 52.2 68.9 40.0 63.6 69.2 53.7 
Shrinking labour 
costs  
62.3 52.2 68.2 60.0 72.7 68.0 56.1 
Shrinking external 
costs of marketing 
goods/services  
27.3 26.1 29.5 20.0 27.3 16.0 34.1 
Entering another 
business sector 
36.4 39.1 31.8 50.0 54.5 24.0 39.0 
Liquidation of firm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others  5.2 4.3 4.5 10.0 9.1 0 7.3 
The data in the above table shows that the methods most frequently used to survive a crisis are the reduction of 
administrative and labour costs, followed by entering another business sector. 
The transformation of a business takes 60 days on average (5 days at minimum and 730 days at maximum). The 
average "price of survival" is 100 Levs (minimum zero and maximum 10,000 Levs). The transformation of 
business is most protracted and expensive in Sofia (See Table 41). 
 
Table 41 
Cost (days and 
money) to 
transform 
business 
Total Production Trade Services 
 Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs 
Arithmetical mean 152.13 2,064.29 238.89 1,683.33 112.5 2,431.82 131.14 1,625.00 
Median 60 100 60 50 60 100 60 1,750 
Minimum 5 0       
Maximum 730 10,000       
Valid cases 32 21 9 6 16 11 7 4 
  Sofia Large district 
centre 
Smaller town 
   Days Levs Days Levs Days Levs 
Arithmetical mean   354.17 5,837.5 56.11 400 131.65 2,050.0 
Median   287.5  6,625 50 0 60 1,650 
Valid cases   6 4 9 9 17 8 
The huge dispersion in the responses is due to the specificity of each individual case. 
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IV. Conclusions 
The review of existing Bulgarian legislation and the analysis of the empirical data prompt me to make the following 
conclusions: 
1. The identification, measuring and, mostly, the reduction of firms' transaction costs are of particular 
importance to the Bulgarian economy at present, as the share of its informal segment tends to be between 
22 and 40%. We cannot be sure about the exact dimensions of the shadow economy but it seems to 
grow more dynamically than the registered one. This could mean that either many newly-formed firms 
start operating "in the shades" or that firms operating in the daylight tend to go underground. In general 
terms, the reason is that the transaction costs of operating in the daylight grow as compared to those of 
operating in the shadow. Hence, the identification, measurement and reduction of transaction costs would 
be critical in curbing the "grey" segment of Bulgarian economy; 
2. The present study would be of some help not by calculating the arithmetical mean of entry costs in terms 
of time and money but by identifying the underlying reasons for these costs. That could enhance any 
further efforts to minimize such costs in future; 
3. As a result of the lack of preliminary regulation impact assessment, many regulations in the country make 
the firms incur transaction costs which are often completely unnecessary or hidden. In Bulgarian 
legislation there are a lot of examples in support of this assertion; 
4. The legislation often transfers the costs of enforcing and applying the rules onto the entrepreneurs or 
introduces quasi-taxes which are compensated by income concealing and tax avoidance. The licensing 
legislation as a whole and many other instruments could serve as good examples in this respect; 
5. Further to the review of the legislation that affects the business environment in Bulgaria, the following main 
groups of transaction costs have been identified as stemming from existing legal rules and from the 
interaction with public authorities: 
 firm registration costs; 
 costs of obtaining a license, permit or registration of the business to be carried on; 
 operating costs relating to: legislative amendments; access to lending; search for and supplies of 
the indispensable raw materials, goods and services; office maintenance and product marketing; 
labour market and social security legislation; audits / inspections and reporting; debts to the 
Treasury; 
 contractual costs (entering into and performance of contracts); 
 transformation and exit costs. 
6. The transaction costs that entrepreneurs incur to register their firms are costs of time rather than financial 
costs and are mainly caused by the thoughtless legislative framework and the lack of cooperation among 
the bodies of public administration involved; 
7. The transaction costs of obtaining licenses and permits are high and stem from the irrational and 
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inconsistent regulations as well as from their unsatisfactory implementation. The licensing procedures and 
requirements make the entrepreneurs incur costs in terms of time and money and actually represent an 
entry barrier. At the same time, they restrict competition and increase the transaction costs within a given 
sector, thus decreasing the market efficiency and increasing the segment of the shadow economy; 
8. The licensing and permission procedures are the main reason for administrative delays in starting-up a 
business in the country. The lengthy time limits for obtaining permits result from the unwise regulatory 
framework and the discretion of public officials in the process of its enforcement. The compulsory 
sequence of the steps in the procedure, the non-transparent requirements and the poor technical 
equipment of the institutions involved make even bigger the waste of time and money; 
9. The discretion of the officials mentioned above also causes large discrepancies in the entry transaction 
costs incurred by firms within the same sector and in the same town. This inevitably affects their price 
competitiveness and places at an extreme disadvantage those firms which start up later and by incurring 
higher costs as a result of the existing administrative discretion in Bulgarian laws; 
10. The lack of preliminary regulation impact assessment results in frequent legislative amendments which, in 
turn, burden the firms with numerous extra transaction costs. The frequent amendments to existing 
regulations make the business environment highly volatile and increase the transaction costs, thus offering 
more incentives to operate "in the shades"; 
11. The access to direct or indirect funding is very restricted due to the low supply of loans and the 
underdeveloped capital market in the country. The unstable business environment keeps high the credit 
risk for banks, on the one hand, and make the entrepreneurs reluctant to use loans, on the other hand; 
12. Many small and medium-sized enterprises in the country suffer from bad financial management. Some 
Bulgarian entrepreneurs are not really aware of the level of transaction costs relating to office maintenance 
and product marketing. This could be explained by failure to realise the importance of this information 
and by the huge number of reports, statements, declarations and registrations which are required by the 
State and are quite time-consuming for the managers.  
13. Interacting with the State (by way of audits, inspections and reports) takes each entrepreneur 5 weeks 
per year on average and gives rise to different levels of transaction costs; 
14. The high percentage of debts to the Treasury (customs duties, excise, taxes, social security and health 
insurance contributions, etc.) encourages the firms to conceal revenues and to transfer many of their 
operations into the shadow sector. 
V. Recommendations 
The review of present Bulgarian business legislation, the empirical data analysis and conclusions made during the 
study, prompt me to outline the following recommendations: 
1. Entry transaction costs of time and money could be substantially reduced by putting in place an 
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information network linking the bodies of public administration. This would ensure a rapid and easy 
access to public registers and would make unnecessary the visits to any other institutions after the court; 
2. The administrative delays in starting up and the transaction costs involved could be significantly lowered 
by streamlining the licensing procedure as follows: 
 reducing to a minimum the number of licenses and replacing the transfer regimes with declaratory 
regimes for all types of business, except those bearing on the health of citizens, public policy and 
national security; 
 if licensing is deemed to be the proper approach, at least four principles should be observed: 
a) licensing regimes should only be introduced by a law which stipulates all necessary and sufficient 
requirements to obtain the license in question. The legislative instruments should not contain 
provisions enabling the administration to impose other requirements in addition to those laid down 
by law; 
b) the State institutions must be prohibited from requesting information already provided to another 
public authority or to a public register. In other words, the cost of exchanging information among 
the different bodies of public administration should not be incurred by the business; 
c) the time limits for issuing a license must be set out in the law and the licensing authorities should 
not have a chance to modify them; 
d) the licenses should be termless and not issued for a limited period of time. They should only be 
revoked on the grounds of violations. 
3. In order to reduce the transaction costs in the course of firms' operations, the existing Draft Law on 
Legislative Instruments should be modified so as to insert in it a preliminary impact assessment 
requirement for all legislative instruments. In other words, preliminary debates and analyses must always 
be carried to make clear the expected positive or negative implications and who would suffer what. The 
wide public involvement in such debates would make it possible: 
 to assess the upsides and downsides for various social circles; 
 to avoid needless costs for the implementation, explanation of and compliance with the legislative 
instruments; and 
 to compare the costs and advantages of introducing a rule with the benefits lost as a result of not 
opting for other solutions. 
4. The transaction costs of time and money in finding and supplying raw materials and goods could be 
seriously reduced by improving the exchange of information on the market. The business associations and the 
chambers of commerce could help a great deal in that respect by facilitating the access of entrepreneurs to 
business information.39 In addition, entrepreneurs themselves should realise how important the up-to-date 
information on their operations and whereabouts is, and should accordingly notify any change. 
5. The efforts of NGOs in training representatives of SMEs are particularly relevant, especially in the field of 
financial management and corporate governance. 
                                                 
39 An appropriate example is the following web site: www.major-companies.ro/. 
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